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ABSTRACT 
 
 The purpose of this study is to trace federal involvement in public K-12 education policy 
and to determine its effectiveness. Specifically, I present a historical analysis of federal 
education policy leading to the passage of Race to the Top (RTTT) in 2009.  My goal is to show 
that, although the federal government has grown more involved in education policy, especially 
from the late 1980s (following the 1983 publication of A Nation At Risk that showed the failings 
of the nation’s schools) until present, actually students in the K-12 public education system have 
not progressed as the federal government had hoped. The measurement of progress, Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP), has not been met in many states as set forth in the legislation No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB), passed by the U.S. Congress in 2001 and signed by President George W. 
Bush in 2002, that set a goal of all students reaching proficiency or advanced in reading and 
mathematics by 2014.  Because of the unrealistic expectations and no additional funding to reach 
the set goal, many scholars called the law an unfunded mandate and most educators grew weary 
of trying to meet the goal.  As a result of the unfavorable education climate created by NCLB, 
the U.S. Congress offered relief in the form of RTTT, a grants reward program, passed by the 
U.S. Congress and signed into legislation by President Barack Obama in 2009.  That program 
offered $4.35 billion to states whose applications were accepted over other states applications in 
order to provide funding for creative educational programming within their borders.  But, my 
study shows that the additional funding helped improve AYP modestly or insignificantly as 
shown in particular by the District of Columbia, which is highlighted in this study. Finally, my 
study offers a survey of teachers and administrators in a prominent school district in St. Louis 
County,  
iii 
  
Missouri, that confirms that educators are against the notion of relying on an-end-of-the year 
state assessment to show evidence of student achievement and the notion of tying teachers’ and 
administrators’ salaries to student test scores, both of which are elements of RTTT. 
 Keywords: No Child Left Behind, Race to the Top, Adequate Yearly Progress 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
Education has become a focus of presidential elections, federal bureaucratic policy 
development and implementation and U.S. congressional legislation.  As the federal government 
has become more involved in education policy, an area in which states traditionally has led, how 
does the federal government get the states to do what it wants?  More importantly, after the 
federal government gets the states onboard, is federal K-12 education policy effective?  
The central question driving this dissertation is the effectiveness of the federal 
government’s involvement in education. To test the effectiveness of federal involvement, I 
examine the development of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), federal education legislation, which 
became law in 2002, and use the review as a basis to analyze the federal education policy, Race 
To The Top (RTTT), also federal education legislation, which was approved in 2009.   Those 
two pieces of legislation, while different in nature at the time of implementation, either built on 
existing conventional wisdom, in the case of NCLB, or substantially modified the prior situation, 
as in the case of RTTT.   Specifically, NCLB required states to adopt improvement measures, 
such as testing, accountability instruments, and improved teacher qualifications, as a way to 
grade schools’ performance in an effort to raise student achievement (NCLB, 1444-1446).  
NCLB has led critics to accuse the federal government of requiring the states to use its own 
resources to implement the policy, while withholding funds if the policy goals are unmet, thus 
being tagged as an unfunded mandate (Munich 2005,1).  However, annual performance 
assessment results, as measured by Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) required under NCLB, 
were low (Center On Education Policy 2011, 2-3).  The goal of states meeting 100 percent 
proficiency in English and math assessments within 12 years of the law’s implementation was 
unmet. 
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On the other hand, in the case of RTTT, the federal government used its leverage to offer 
funding in the form of a grant rewards program to states that met criteria to create an 
environment for education improvement, particularly by showing improvement in the following 
areas:  school assessments; efforts to recruit, prepare and develop effective teachers and 
principals; data systems to measure student growth and success; and turn-around of their lowest-
achieving schools (Race To The Top Executive Summary, 2).  However, AYP results showed 
that states involved in RTTT fared only slightly better in meeting AYP goals than those not 
involved in RTTT (Center for Education Policy 2011, 2-3).    
With the passage of NCLB and RTTT many scholars have concluded that the federal 
government has become the solid leader in education policy.  Indeed, the federal government has 
shown its fortitude with the passage of NCLB and RTTT, legislation that have required states to 
prove their effectiveness in order to gain federal funding. Now, most recently, President Barack 
Obama signed into law in 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), which is the latest federal 
education legislation that reauthorized the 50-year-old Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA) and updated NCLB. President Obama and Congress have reported that the legislation is 
a better law to prepare students for their futures (U.S. Department of Education 2015). 
Examining the historical framework of ESSA, which lies within NCLB and RTTT, will help to 
clarify federal involvement in education policy and whether it has been effective. 
Indeed, given the premise that the federal government has shown leadership in education 
policy, it is important to find out how effective federal leadership has been. By offering a brief 
historical account of U.S. education policy through the implementation of NCLB, and then 
examining RTTT, the effectiveness of federal leadership in education policy can be documented 
and explained.  My research will answer the following questions:  (1) What did the authors of 
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NCLB think they were doing? (2)  Did NCLB do what its authors thought it was going to do?  
(3) What did not happen? (4) What did happen that they did not say they expected?  (5) What did 
the authors of RTTT think they were doing?  (6)  Did RTTT do what its authors thought it was 
going to do? (7)  What did not happen?  (8) What did happen that they did not say they 
expected?  Answering those questions will offer comprehensive policy analysis in the area of 
education policy that will contribute to the field of political science. Below is an outline of the 
following chapters. 
Chapter two consists of an historical overview of the problem of federal effectiveness in 
education. Chapter two includes various scholars’ historical analyses of the evolution of federal 
involvement public education.  Chapter two particularly demonstrates how the ESEA, signed 
into law in 1965 under President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, allowed latitude for the 
states to develop programs for its critical schools with $1.5 billion committed to public 
education.  Chapter two’s narrative also shows that the latitude afforded under ESEA gradually 
eroded after slipping SAT scores in the1970s was followed by the document, A Nation At Risk, a 
report that alarmed the public of the problem of public education in the 1980s. Furthermore, 
chapter two shows that education politics of the late 1980s and 1990s laid the foundation for the 
political development of NCLB, which became law in 2002. 
Chapter three answers the key question:  What did the authors of NCLB think they were 
doing?  To answer that question, chapter three outlines and analyzes important elements of the 
legislation. Additionally, chapter three’s narration shows that Frank R. Baumgartner’s and Bryan 
D. Jones’ (2009) framework centering the punctuated equilibrium model of policy change is 
relevant to understanding the political development and passage of NCLB.  Chapter three also 
shows that John Kingdon’s (2011) multiple streams model also helps explain the development of 
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NCLB. Additionally, chapter three answers the key question:  Did NCLB do what its authors 
thought it was going to do?  To answer that question, chapter three presents data to show whether 
NCLB was effective.  Also, chapter three includes various scholars’ analyses, which conclude 
that the weight of the evidence is that NCLB was a failure.   
Chapter four discusses the origin, creation, groundwork and goals of RTTT.  More 
specifically, the chapter answers the question:  What did the authors of RTTT think they were 
doing?  To answer that question, chapter four outlines and analyzes key aspects of the legislation 
and offers a review of a state application that won a grant and a state application that failed to 
win a grant. Also, chapter four is devoted to discussing the background leading to the adoption of 
RTTT. In this analysis, I rely on the website, Policy Agendas Project, produced by the University 
of Texas at Austin.  The website details several major policy areas and congressional hearings on 
those areas. Finally, chapter four’s narration also shows that Frank R. Baumgartner’s and Bryan 
D. Jones’ (2009) framework centering the punctuated equilibrium model and John Kingdon’s 
(2011) multiple streams model of policy change is relevant to the political development and 
passage of RTTT. 
Chapter five consists of answering the following key question:  Did RTTT do what its 
authors thought it was going to do?  Based on research, the chapter shows that RTTT only helped 
states meet AYP objectives at a slightly greater rate. The remaining part of chapter five outlines 
Phase 2 competition for states in 2010.  Specifically, I focus on Washington D.C., whose 
education officials submitted a successful proposal in Phase 2, and trace how that proposal fared 
during the review process and one year after implementation.  Chapter five also includes a 
survey from teachers and administrators at a successful suburban school district in St. Louis 
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County, Missouri.  Finally, chapter five concludes by making a few brief generalizations about 
how the political development surrounding the adoption of RTTT led to the passage of ESSA.  
Chapter six offers a conclusion. The research has shown that the adoption of NCLB and 
political development of RTTT are classic cases of the punctuated equilibrium framework of 
policy change and multiple streams model of policy change. The politicians and policy actors 
surrounding both pieces of legislation were so absorbed in satisfying various stakeholders in 
education to achieve a massive goal—improving the nation’s schools—that they developed 
policy that yielded low results.  In the first case, NCLB was an unrealistic, unfunded mandate, 
and, in the second case, RTTT, offered funding to help improve the nation’s schools and relief 
from the confinement of NCLB, but was still caught in the grips of the NCLB legislation, whose 
renewal was still in the works. Politicians built on provisions of RTTT, especially by providing 
federal funding to states to meet AYP goals found in ESSA, although it is too early to determine 
its rate of success as 2016-2017 will be a transition year for ESSA, with implementation 
beginning the summer of 2017. Chapter six discusses implications of the research, especially the 
importance of having a strong voice from education professionals when developing future 
federal education policy and suggests further study, particularly centering on an analysis of 
ESSA. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Chapter Two: Overview of the History of Federal Involvement in Education 
Public education can be traced to colonists who began establishing schools for White 
males in the early 1600s.  Over time, the U.S. public education system has evolved to offer 
standardized services and a broader range of those services.  Additionally, the market for public 
education has expanded over time to include all groups of people.  As a result of those changes, 
the federal government has become more involved in K-12 public education.  By historically 
tracing federal involvement in education, a clear picture emerges that shows the federal 
government has become more dominant over time, pushing states to reform their practices to 
help ensure equality and excellence in education. However, federal involvement in education has 
led some scholars to conclude that U.S. education policies and practices, while promoting good 
intentions, actually, have fallen short of reaching their desired objectives to improve the overall 
K-12 public education environment.    
After the colonists established public schools in the 1600s, gradually, the system became 
more complex, i.e., standardizing curriculum, segregating age for instruction, and instituting 
mandatory attendance during the 1800s.  During the late 1800s and early 1900s, public education 
expanded to include secondary education. As the education system became more complex and 
broad, it became a focus of the Progressive Movement reformers’ efforts in the early 1900s in 
order to help rid societal injustices and ills (Education News 2013).   Progressive reformers’ 
efforts created bureaucratic and professional organizations designed to take politics out of the 
educational system.  Indeed, the effect of Progressive reformers’ efforts was the creation of a 
U.S. bureaucratic system that grew to become massive and that was, and, currently, is linked to 
local offices, and oversees most major education decisions.  However, the so-called winners of 
this system, business, middle class, educational professionals, were least concerned about the 
losers, lower classes, and religious and racial minorities, and rural communities. That system 
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also left a fight for governance, and institutions were put into place, namely the local school 
board, superintendent, and district office, which, in turn, were overseen by state governments 
through their departments of education.  Finally, the U.S. Department of Education linked its 
authority to the state departments. Many major political decisions from busing to sex education 
are handed down through those offices (Chubb and Moe 1990, 4-6).   
In a description of public schools during the latter half of the 19th century to the 
beginning of the 20th century, David B. Tyack (1974) noted that as cities grew in size and 
complexity, so did the local public school bureaucracy. Tyack showed that in 1889, 484 cities 
reported an average of four supervisors without teaching duties per city, but from 1890 until 
1920, that number grew exponentially. Here are his findings: Baltimore went from 9 to 144; 
Boston climbed from 7 to 159; Detroit escalated from 31 to 329; St. Louis increased from 58 to 
155; Cleveland climbed from 10 to 159; Philadelphia moved from 66 to 268; and New York 
jumped from 235 to 1,310 (185).  In his description of the beginning of the development of that 
bureaucracy, Tyack stated: 
From classroom to central office they (superintendents) tried to create new 
controls over pupils, teachers, principals, and other subordinate members of the 
school hierarchy.  Although they often used the nonpolitical language of social 
engineers, they were actually trying to replace village forms in which laymen 
participated in decentralized decision-making with the new bureaucratic model of 
a closed “nonpolitical” system in which directives flowed from the top down, 
reports emanated from the bottom, and each step of the educational process was 
carefully prescribed by professional educators (40).   
 
Public schools continued to develop in a centralized manner during the first half of the 
20th century.  The federal government put forth its education reform initiatives to help ensure 
equality and excellence in education during the 1950s and 1960s when the Civil Rights 
Movement and Cold War were spreading their influence.  After the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling, Brown v. the Topeka, Kansas Board of Education, which overturned legal segregation in 
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public education, one of the federal government’s major roles in public education was ensuring 
school desegregation, which sought to pull African Americans into the mainstream of education 
services and end the injustices of all-black schools that received the worst materials and a staff 
that was spread too thin to be effective (Education News 2013).  Additionally, during the Cold 
War, the federal government responded to the launching of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik—the first 
satellite to orbit the earth—by calling for “improved guidance services, testing, and instruction in 
mathematics, science, and foreign languages” through the 1958 passage of the National Defense 
Education Act or NDEA (Kaestle and Lodewick 2007, 3).  
A more important step in federal involvement in K-12 public education came with its 
Civil Rights agenda and key focus to end poverty in 1960s under the realm of President Lyndon 
B. Johnson’s War on Poverty. Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal 
government used its fiscal muscle by passing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA).  The legislation authorized such programs as Head Start and reading and math programs 
targeted to improve opportunities for disadvantaged children identified in high poverty areas.  
The legislation became a reality in 1965 when President Johnson signed ESEA into law, 
committing $1.5 billion to public education. That money was earmarked for the states to use 
toward their self-developed programs (Spring 2014, 9). Later, ESEA was reauthorized under the 
names, the Improving America’s School Act (IASA) in 1994, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 
2002, and, more currently, Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2015. 
The federal government’s concern for achieving equality in K-12 public education 
continued during the 1970s when the Civil Rights Movement broadened its scope to include 
more groups, such as “English language learners, children with disabilities, Native Americans, 
Latinos and females” by offering “new legal and fiscal resources for new constituencies.” The 
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legislative victories of the 1970 agenda included the following: the Bilingual Education Act of 
1968; Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973; the Equal Opportunities Act of 1974; and Education for all Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975 (renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990) (Umpstead 2008).  
(Critics voiced concern about these programs’ measurable results, and support for them ended 
abruptly in the 1980s with the election of President Ronald Reagan) (Kaestle and Lodewick 
2007, 3). 
Joel Spring (2014) summarized his research on the role of federal government in K-12 
public education as a means to end poverty, inequality, and increase national wealth. The first 
objective—ending poverty—especially became a key focus of ESEA during the 1960s. The shift 
to improving the economy or increasing national wealth occurred in the 1970s, with the 
development of career education programs, and later in the 1980s and 1990s with a push for 
(excellence in) public education to help make U.S. corporations dominant in world markets 
(Spring 2014, 9).   
However, achieving all of those lofty goals led to a collision during the 1970s. In fact, 
many scholars point to the nation’s education environment during the 1970s as the beginning of 
a major downward spiral in K-12 public education.  Indeed, national SAT test scores dipped 
downward during that decade, which led to the publication of the 1983 findings of the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education in the released report, A Nation at Risk.  The report 
offered a grim picture for U.S. education, stating “the educational foundations of our society are 
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation 
and a people” (A Nation At Risk, 1983).  The report offered several recommendations, including 
the nation’s K-12 public schools’ administering standardized tests “at major transition points 
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from one level of schooling to another and particularly from high school to college or work” (A 
Nation At Risk, 1983.)  
Diane Ravitch’s (2010) historical assessment of K-12 public education showed that the 
pendulum has swung from centralization as a cure for failing schools in the 1890s (in order to rid 
society of corrupt local control by creating a federal bureaucracy) to decentralization as the cure 
in the 1960s (in order to provide more benefit to minorities) (5).  She continued that the 1970s 
was marked by an experimental environment created by “leftist historians” who attacked schools 
as “institutions devised by elites to oppress the poor” (5).  But, rather than improving education, 
SAT scores declined, and the federal government responded to the 1970s experiments with the 
study, A Nation at Risk, which issued a plea to make the nation’s schools better (24-25). Since 
the publication of that report, the federal government’s role has expanded in education policy 
making, an area traditionally left to the states and local governments. As mentioned, although, 
the federal government provided money to the states under ESEA, the federal government took a 
back seat to the states that developed their own programs with the use of the federal funds to help 
students in need. However, to reiterate, the publication of A Nation at Risk began to change the 
federal government’s role in education.  
As a result of the publication, A Nation at Risk, the latest major development that 
impacted federal involvement in K-12 public education has come through a long pathway of 
education reform measures, where state standards, accountability measures, and school choice 
are highlighted as a means to reach the highest achievement levels, starting from the late 1980s 
and continuing until present.  The reform measures pushed the federal government into the 
political forefront of K-12 public education. After the publication of A Nation at Risk, the federal 
government no longer sat around passively, issuing money and letting the states decide how to 
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use it as the practice under ESEA. Now, the federal government began to take an aggressive 
leadership role by requiring states to reach the desired outcome—excellence in public education 
as shown by increased test scores—or risk losing federal funding.   
Indeed, Jesse H. Rhodes (2012) verified that the federal involvement in education prior to 
the 1980s was minimal, but rather focused broadly on achieving equality in education for 
disadvantaged groups.  Rhodes stated: 
By the end of the 1970s, the most important, and most expensive, federal 
education programs were geared to providing aid to the economically, physically 
and educationally disadvantaged. The federal grant programs were bolstered by 
laws, regulations, and judicial decisions designed to eliminate racial and sexual 
discrimination and to promote student rights and the rights of the disabled (27).  
  
That system was supported by liberals and members of Congress seeking to channel 
federal funding into their districts. However, the various developments had little impact on 
programs for non-disadvantaged students, and, but rather reinforced “separation between the 
compensatory and regular school programs” (27).  The federal government’s fiscal role in K-12 
education was modest, despite efforts by proponents to increase funding.  Because of the federal 
government’s limited role, one could conclude the message was that K-12 “students and schools 
were performing adequately” (27).  By 1979, the federal government’s $16.6 billion contribution 
approached 10 percent of all spending for elementary and secondary education (32). The states, 
following the federal government, also demanded equal treatment of students after the 1960s, but 
delegated to the local governments decisions centering on curriculum, standards and personnel 
(27-28).   
Although the federal government’s involvement in education following the adoption of 
ESEA in 1965 until the late 1970s created a climate for ending poverty and achieving equality in 
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education as evidenced by various interest groups seeking entitlement under that law, the federal 
government’s role still was supportive of the states. Rhodes stated:   
Federal responsibilities grew within tightly delimited bounds.  In a nod to 
the prerogatives of state and local policymakers, the ESEA and its progeny 
delegated substantial discretion to states and localities to design and implement 
compensatory education programs.  Federal regulations sought to ensure that 
federal education funds reached the students for whom the programs were 
intended, but they did not hold state and local governments accountable for 
actually raising the achievement of eligible students (33-34).  
 
However, the state and federal government’s direct involvement in education policy 
escalated after the publication of A Nation at Risk.  Indeed, from the mid- to late-1980s, the 
federal government’s role transformed from a sideline advocate and supporter of equality in 
education to a leader in public education by pushing for excellence in K-12 public education.  
Rhodes (2012) argued that the political developments of the 1980s actually were pivotal and set 
the tone for education policy today.  It was first assumed that states would lead education reform 
from the early 1980s to the mid-1980s. As Rhodes stated: 
Between 1983 and 1985, every state in the union convened at least one 
commission on the issue of excellence in education; in all, over three hundred 
state-level reform commissions assembled.  This commission activity set the stage 
for an unprecedented wave of state-level lawmaking during the 1980s.  All told, 
the states adopted more than seven hundred statutes related to graduation 
requirements, standards, testing, and teacher quality between 1984 and 1986—
more than they had in the previous twenty years—and continued to adopt 
additional policies through the end of the decade (63).  
  
Eventually, the 1980s education dialogue and state reform efforts geared toward 
excellence in education was transformed into a “standards-based” reform paradigm, “which 
proposed to strengthen education systems by aligning them around coordinated standards, 
testing, and accountability policies” (Rhodes 2012, 70).  As the standards movement progressed 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, another more conservative and controversial element arose—
13 
 
private school choice at the center of improving schools (Rhodes 2012, 91). Although the 
standards movement with school choice at its core, centered on one goal—improving the 
nation’s schools—the movements culminated with the 2002 legislation, NCLB, which eventually 
became the focus of much criticism. 
In summary, the federal government had taken an incremental leadership role in public 
education from the early 1900s until the late 1980s. Federal involvement in K-12 public 
education can be traced to the 1900s Progressive Era that attempted to take politics out of the 
schools, but left the nation with a federal bureaucratic system. Federal involvement in education 
continued to expand with the Cold War and Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s and 
with a broader constituency of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1970s. But, an escalated zeal 
centering on federal involvement in education began with a push for excellence in education 
after the report, A Nation at Risk, from the late 1980s to present that has been evident by a long 
pathway of policies, based on standards, accountability and school choice.  
 The gradual expansion of federal involvement in K-12 public education over the last 30 
years has led many scholars to study the impact of federal involvement and to conclude that 
federal policies and practices, especially the practice of how the federal government gets the 
states onboard to achieve desired goals, have left the education environment unimproved. One 
way the federal government gets the states to do what it wants is by issuing mandates, a practice 
that many scholars think is ineffective.  For example, John Chubb and Terry Moe (1990) 
concluded from their research that the institution of public education is the problem with 
education because of the nature of its bureaucratic organization that is riddled with mandates not 
only from the federal level, but from the state, and local levels as well.  The federal mandates 
gradually became more complicated during the 1990s, finally culminating with the federal 
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government demanding results in the form of improved test scores or risk teachers’ and 
administrators’ contracts not being renewed and school closings. That is, the federal government 
demanded a system of statewide accountability based on measurement leading to increased 
school choice, which was the basis of NCLB in 2002, and, more recently, RTTT in 2009.  The 
next section will examine that legislative pathway. 
Federal Involvement in Education:  Political Development during the late 1980s to early 
2000s 
Standards, accountability and school choice, which were key focuses of federal 
involvement in K-12 public education from the late 1980s until early 2000s, have been the 
subject of much scholarly research.  For example, many scholars have traced that political 
development and assessed the merits of the school choice approach, including whether the 
market-based approach is a realistic solution for the so-called product—education—that has been 
redefined over the years to have various meanings to various so-called consumers—parents and 
their children.  Indeed, for more than 10 years from the late 1980s until early 2000s, much of the 
major aspect of federal involvement in K-12 public education was built upon the conventional 
wisdom that school choice based on standards and accountability was the best route for our 
nation’s public schools.  That pathway led to the 2002 passage of NCLB and 2009 passage of 
RTTT. Much of the scholarly research, however, has shown that the approach to federal 
involvement in K-12 public education was flawed. 
To understand the discussion centering on school choice, we must first understand the 
basic structure of K-12 public education system. The major choice available to most parents 
opting for public schools is the selection of a community as large metropolitan areas are divided 
into smaller neighborhoods and suburbs. Families’ choice in public school districts is tied to how 
much they are willing to spend for a house or apartment in that district, given that higher quality 
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education often coincides with higher property values and incomes. “A significant measure of 
the market value of a house is the prevailing opinion on the quality of the schools were it is 
located” (Making The Grade 1983, 19).   
Another form of school choice is found with the option of private schools, which parents 
must pay for in addition to property taxes for their local public school. Therefore, parents who 
are of a higher-income level have a greater choice for their children—either public school 
districts or private schools (Making The Grade 1983, 19).   A third form of school choice is 
found within the realm of charter schools, which are public schools operating under contracts 
between the schools and agencies operating them (Robertson 2012, 159). Hence, advocates of 
school choice believe that all parents, regardless of income level, should be able to take 
advantage of a greater pool of choice geared toward the education for their children.   
Such a noble goal as free and universal education should be set and reached in a 
democratic society that seeks equality for all people.  However, the means by which to achieve 
that reality has been the cause of great debate. Setting minimal standards for schools chosen, 
which can lead to school closings, is a negative means by which to accomplish the desired goal 
of school choice. 
 As noted in the previous section, following the publication of A Nation at Risk, state 
reform efforts centering on standards and accountability were practiced as the key to achieving 
excellence in education. Following state reform efforts, the federal government began to plunge 
into education reform by pressing for excellence in education. Four presidents contributed to the 
eventual passage of NCLB.  First, presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush raised the 
issue in speeches during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Rhodes 2012, 64).  Also, during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, both presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush sought to give more 
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choice to parents by allowing tax credits for the tuition paid by parents of private school 
children, (Urban, 311).  Next, in 1989, President George H. W. Bush went a step further by 
agreeing “with the nation’s governors on the adoption of six National Education Goals, which 
detailed performance expectations that schools and students were supposed to meet by the year 
2000” (Rhodes 2012, 70).  He had teamed at with then Arkansas Democratic Gov. Bill Clinton, 
who was president of the National Governors’ Association and leader of education reform in his 
state at that time, at an education conference in Charlottesville, Va. (Congressional Quarterly 
Researcher, 2005, 482).   At the heart of Goals 2000 were “six nonbinding education goals that 
included competency testing in basic subjects in the fourth, eighth, and twelfth grades,” 
(Robertson 2012, 160).  Then “Bush proposed, and Congress debated the ‘America 2000’ 
initiative, which called on the federal government to support the establishment of voluntary 
national standards and voluntary national tests, and to promote private school choice options” 
(Rhodes 2012, 70).  Although America 2000 was not enacted into law, education reform groups, 
consisting of “business entrepreneurs, civil rights entrepreneurs, educational conservatives, and 
state leaders in building institutions and relationships capable of maintaining and expanding their 
agendas” created an atmosphere of “growing enthusiasm for greater federal involvement” in 
public K-12 education (Rhodes 2012, 70-71). Rhodes stated: 
In this early period of federal involvement—when the scope of federal 
engagement remained modest and ill-defined—these four groups continued to 
work in parallel (and sometimes in concert) to promote similar reforms.  
Continuing their work as political entrepreneurs, each of these groups engaged in 
extensive extra-governmental agenda setting, organizational maintenance, and 
coalition building to reinforce the cause of school reform at the state and federal 
levels.  The importance of policy knowledge and professional networks was on 
full display, as entrepreneurs leveraged their expertise, personal relationships with 
policymakers, and access to foundation funding to influence policy.  These 
processes set the stage for major shifts in education policymaking in subsequent 
years, dramatically expanding the federal role in education in the United States. 
(Rhodes 2012, 71).  
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 The education reform groups continued their efforts after their defeat of America 2000 
and “drove federal leadership of standards-based reforms to the top of the national education 
agenda in 1991 and 1992” (Rhodes 2012, 71).  The standards-based reforms were later adopted 
and put into law in the Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994 (during the administration of 
President Bill Clinton) (Robertson 2012, 160). Clinton, as well as his successor, President 
George W. Bush championed school reform, “dedicating considerable policymaking, as well as 
rhetorical attention to the subject” during mid 1990s and early 2000s. (Rhodes 2012, 64).   
To reiterate, President George H.W. Bush’s initiative also supported the promotion of 
private school choice options. Diane Ravitch stated that she supported school choice in her 
position as an assistant secretary and counselor to the secretary in the U.S. Department of 
Education during the presidency of George H.W. Bush. Ravitch stated: 
If kids were not succeeding in their regular public school, why not let 
them take their federal funds to another public school or to a private—even 
religious—school?  Since affluent families could choose their schools by moving 
to a better neighborhood or enrolling their children in private schools, why 
shouldn’t poor families have similar choices?  In the decade following my stint in 
the federal government, I argued that certain managerial and structural changes—
that is, choice, charters, merit pay, and accountability—would help to reform our 
schools.  With such changes, teachers and schools would be judged by their 
performance; this was a basic principle in the business world.  Schools that failed 
to perform would be closed, just as a corporation would close a branch office that 
continually produced poor returns. Having been immersed in a world of true 
believers, I was influenced by their ideas (8).   
 
However, Ravitch, said she became disenchanted with choice and accountability because 
they were too “speculative and uncertain,” and, therefore, she said she reverted to support public 
education (13).   
To understand the push for reform on the federal level for K-12 public education, it is 
important to review the state reform efforts in the late1980s and early 1990s. At that time, state 
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reform efforts produced little substantial improvements with insignificant thought of the reality 
of implementation on a daily basis in the classroom. Therefore, as reform effort after reform 
effort was generated in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, some scholars concluded that any 
positive desired effects or results of the reform efforts actually was lost in the chain of reforms.  
These extensive efforts have produced few substantive results, prompting 
the Rand Corporation’s 1995 report Reinventing Public Education to begin with 
the question, ‘Why has a decade of work on school reform produced so little?’ … 
Quite simply, urban school reform is not really about improving 
education.  Reform represents a district’s continuous response to political 
necessity—not a district’s dramatic break with the status quo.  In fact, a state of 
perpetual reform is the status quo. This surfeit of reform is responsible for many 
of the problems that reforms are then expected to solve. The cruel paradox is that 
the same impulses that drive reform also ensure that reform will be pursed under 
conditions that make large-scale success highly unlikely. The most significant 
reason education reform has not produced results is that reform is not primarily 
about producing results.  Instead reforms are intended to rally community support 
without imposing the costs required by significant and sustained efforts at 
improvement.  
Emphasis on the politically attractive aspects of reform has resulted in 
inattention to the details of implementing reform. For example, Pauly has 
observed, ‘A clear and consistent finding of education policy research is that 
policies and reforms often fall apart when they encounter the realities of daily life 
in the classrooms.’ Meaningful change requires time to focus on selected reforms 
and then to nurture those efforts at the school sites.  … Schools and teachers are 
given little time to become acclimated to one initiative before the next is 
launched.   
This churning of policy is inimical to long-term improvement (Hess, 1998, 
109).  
 
Larry Cuban (1990) suggested that state education reforms had failed to remove the 
problems intended to solve for several reasons. He argued that reformers must be careful to 
assess whether they are dealing with the problem or the politics of the problem and reformers 
must ask what thoughts and metaphors are they using. For example, he stated that relying on 
business firms as a model for the education environment, i.e., education as a product and parents 
and students as consumers, may not be the correct fit (as a social institution differs from a 
business).  In summary, Cuban concluded that education reforms return because decision makers 
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use irrational methods.  Cuban correctly has assessed a major problem with state and federal 
education reform measures since the late 1980s as reformers latch onto metaphors, treat them as 
factual, and sell their stories and solutions to politicians, education stakeholders, and unwavering 
supporters, without investing time and effort into solid research that could produce more viable 
and productive outcomes for all of those concerned. 
Frederick Hess (1998) argued that, in reality, K-12 public education is governed by an 
amateur local school board with little power to generate effective solutions to improve the 
mediocre performance of its schools.  As a result, the board relies on a superintendent who has 
the pressure to be a “reformist superintendent.” However, due to the short tenure of a 
superintendent’s term, generally three to four years, he must set initiatives into place, and rely on 
the following superintendent to put those initiatives into place.  That is the nature in which K-12 
public education policy is designed, practices oversight and implementation (Hess 1998, 111-
112). Therefore, given the amateur manner in which K-12 public education policy is designed 
and administered and given the rapid change in policy that is so evident, “carefully constructed 
choice-based plans can be a solution to help discourage policy churn” (Hess 1998, 122).   
However, the choice-base plans were not carefully constructed, but rather simply based 
on test scores. As a matter of fact, due to low test scores, many long-established schools abruptly 
were closed in historic neighborhoods—a situation that left many parents and students in a 
quandary where they were left with forced choice. Indeed in Chicago Public Schools (CPS), 44 
schools were closed from 2001 until 2009 due to “poor academic performance or 
underutilization,” two areas of consideration outlined by the state of Illinois (de la Torre and 
Gwynne, 2009).  
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To reiterate, the dialogue of school choice began after the 1983 publication of A Nation at 
Risk under Reagan’s presidency, and progressed during the 1990s until present.  School choice 
was put into place using various policy measures that ultimately tied into one goal—school 
choice as determined by standards and accountability, which led the passage of NCLB in 2002 
and later RTTT in 2009. The school choice argument was wrapped around the idea of the federal 
government issuing to the states a basic mandate—improve their practices or risk losing its 
federal funding. 
The next section of this chapter will look at research regarding the effectiveness of 
mandates in K-12 public education more critically through the perspectives of two scholars—
Chubb and Moe (1990) and Jeffery R. Henig (1994)—who held opposing views during the early 
1990s.  
Federal Involvement in Education:  A Difference of Opinion on Education Policy Solutions 
during the late 1980s to early 1990s       
The importance of this scholarly disagreement is for understanding the nature of the 
discussions and studies surrounding K-12 public education in the United States during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, a time period that laid the foundation for the political development of 
NCLB in 2002 and RTTT in 2009. The basic point that Chubb and Moe made is that school 
choice must be the wave of the future of public education in the United States because the 
market-based approach weeds out unsuccessful schools.  Also, they argued that all schools need 
the autonomy enjoyed by private schools, which have been free from federal, state and local 
control, and, thereby, have the ability to direct educational programs toward their targeted 
market, i.e., the families that choose their schools.  The basic point that Henig made about Chubb 
and Moe’s argument is that empirically-based research must be must be balanced with an 
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element of social analysis before conclusions are reached. The rest of this section looks at those 
arguments in more detail.  
Chubb and Moe showed that public school’s bureaucratic organization, which is filled 
with federal, state, and local mandates, hinder any progress. Moreover, the authors concluded 
that public education cannot be improved with policy decisions regarding programs and funding 
until the actual institution is changed.  Indeed, Chubb and Moe quoted the 1983 findings of the 
National Commission on Excellence in Education, which released its report, A Nation at Risk. 
The report sent a shock wave through the state departments of education, which, in turn, held 
debates and developed solutions: “stricter graduation requirements, more rigorous ladders and 
(occasionally) merit pay for teachers, stricter disciplinary policy, more homework, longer school 
days or years, and greater reliance on standardized tests of student performance, among others”  
(Chubb and Moe, 10).  
Those reforms, however, were met with the question of how control was to be exercised 
by the governmental entities that ran schools in order to improve the schools.  Yet, Chubb and 
Moe argued that the actual institutions that governed schools were never examined in terms of 
reform (11). The authors argued that true educational reform must be at the institutional level, 
but the subject never came up, because the educational institution has been polluted over time 
with factions whose goal was to protect their interests and struggle for power rather than improve 
the educational system (12). The authors argued that many groups oppose educational reform, 
because institutions stabilize overtime and develop a natural course of operation that produce 
benefits to recipients, and those groups of beneficiaries resist fundamental change.  Those groups 
include, “educational administrators, school board members, professionals, teachers and other 
established players in the educational system” (12).  
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 The authors quoted a myriad of studies that summarized what school reform meant in the 
1980s, only to conclude that the reforms were destined to fail because they dealt with policy and 
not with institutions.  The authors stated that 1980 reformers pushed for the following: “clear 
school goals, rigorous academic standards, order and discipline, homework, strong leadership by 
the principal, teacher participation in decision making, parental support and cooperation, and 
high expectations for student performance” (16).  The authors continued that “policy changes 
without institutional change went against the grain of social science” (18). Their rational is basic: 
the institutions are the causes of the problems they are trying to solve. They stated: “In our view, 
these institutions are more than simply the democratic means by which policy solutions are 
formulated and administered.  They are also fundamental causes of the very problems they are 
supposed to be solving” (18).  The authors continued that the problem of the K-12 public school 
institutions in America is that arrangements for democratic control form a structure for choices 
for the participants, and that structure is “ill-suited to the effective performance of American 
public schools.”  The authors stated, “If Americans want effective schools, it appears they must 
first create new institutions that, in their effects on the choices of individuals, naturally function 
to promote rather than inhibit the right kinds of organizations” (21).  
 To arrive at their conclusion, the authors collected data from two massive surveys.  The 
data sources include the High School and Beyond (HSB) survey, first administered in 1980 as 
the largest data set on high schools and their students until that time and the Administrator and 
Teacher Survey (ATS) in 1983-84 (22). The goal was to go back to the schools of the HSB and 
talk to those who ran those schools.  The conclusions from the data were threefold.  The 
conclusions are based on survey data divided in the following areas: organization of schools, 
student achievement and institutional context.   A summary of their findings is as follows: “One, 
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schools do indeed perform better to the extent … they have such general qualities as clear goals, 
an ambitious academic program, strong educational leadership, and high levels of teacher 
professionalism.  Two, the most important prerequisite for the emergence of effective school 
characteristic is school autonomy, especially from external bureaucratic influence.  Three, 
America’s existing system of public education inhibits the emergence of effective organizations.  
This occurs, most fundamentally, because its institutions of democratic control function naturally 
to limit and undermine school autonomy” (23).  In other words, the authors concluded from 
research findings that the very nature of public education, organized in a bureaucratic 
framework, goes directly against school autonomy, which is a necessary component in order to 
establish a dynamic and effective school environment.   
Chubb and Moe offered several examples to support their argument that the bureaucratic 
organization of K-12 public schools is detrimental for establishing effective schools. First, 
regarding authority and decision-making, the authors’ research showed that those areas are 
attached to public officials, but, rather than being democratic, they are instead coercive (28).  
Losers, in the process, they argued, must support the winners’ programs, no matter how much 
they despise them. However, in markets, the authors argued, government only sets the 
framework for the rules, rather than impose programs to be followed (29).  Second, regarding the 
goals of schools, the authors’ research showed that public schools must provide every service to 
every kind of student all at once, whereas schools in the private sector do not have to undergo 
such awesome tasks.  “Schools can therefore be asked to move in every direction at once, from 
sex education to psychological counseling to the socialization of immigrants to vocational 
training to desegregation to mainstreaming of the handicapped to bilingual education.  
Somewhere in all of this, they are expected to provide students with ‘academic excellence’” (54).  
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In comparison, in the private sector, schools only need “to find their niche” to be successful.  
Finally, regarding the practice of schools, the authors’ research showed that the public schools 
are burdened with rules about everything from curriculum, instructional methods, and time spent 
on activities, and, thus teachers “are constrained in their efforts to perform their educational tasks 
as they see fit.”  They are also expected to spend time documenting that they have followed rules 
(Chubb and Moe 59).  However, the authors stated that, in the private sector, however, emphasis 
is placed on academic rigor, personal growth, or artistic expression (60).  Hence, according to 
Chubb and Moe, the very nature of public education—demanding that their employees, namely 
teachers and administration, meet the needs of the masses, follow regulations, and document 
tasks, impair their ability to successfully educate its population of children. 
The question that Henig (1994) raised in his research is whether democratic institutions 
that run public schools are more effective in solving the problems associated with public 
education or whether the private market is the key to success.  Henig stated, “School-choice 
proposals would shift the focus of educational decision making from the government arena—in 
which elected officials, public bureaucracies, and organized interest groups are central players—
to a market-based arena, in which the personal preferences of children and their families 
presumably will have a more prominent place.  To the familiar claim that market forces are more 
efficient modes for allocating scarce resources is added the claim that they are more responsive to 
the felt needs and desires of the average citizen” (5).  Henig added that, strangely enough, people 
who hold the view that private markets are more efficient than the public arena also state that 
markets are the more democratic approach (5).   
However, Henig concluded that privatization is the wrong solution to public education’s 
problems. Henig said, “market-oriented proposals favored by the ‘restructures’ (those in favor of 
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privatization) are unlikely to work as projected and more likely than not to make things 
considerably worse” (5).  Henig stated that the reason that the privatization remedy is not a 
viable option to public education problems is that it is based on faulty notions of the problems 
associated with public education as well as faulty assumptions about results of privatization.  
Henig stated, “By selectively retelling the history of education policy, they (advocates of market-
based approaches to educational restructuring) have reinforced prejudices about governmental 
ineptitude, benign markets, and intimate communities” (11).  He continued that restructuring 
education has been viewed by proponents as “low risk with predictable results” (11).  He further 
stated that performance of schools being judged only by the schools’ appeal to the education 
consumer, neglects the under-mobilized, discounts future generations, and disregards the fact 
that schools have the responsibility of shaping interests as well as responding to them (11).         
Not only did Henig find that privatization is the wrong solution to education problems, 
but he further asserted that the diagnosis of the extent of the problems associated with public 
education is inaccurate (5).  Henig emphasized that labeling the education problem as a “crisis” 
should be viewed as extreme and with caution, because with that comes the assertion that 
“incremental change will not suffice,” based on the assumption that the institutions and processes 
have failed (31). Even though U.S. public education has experienced problems, the scope of 
those problems may have been exaggerated.  He disputed the urgency of A Nation at Risk by 
stating that Paul Peterson noted that almost every decade, there seems to be a report of crisis: “In 
the 1920s it was inefficiency, in the 1930s fiscal problems, in the 1950s Russia’s scientific 
challenge, in the 1960s racial segregation and excessive bureaucratization. The frequency with 
which crises have been identified in America education suggests that caution be exercised in 
characterizing educational difficulties, so that the rhetoric used does not automatically escalate 
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problems into something more” (26).  Henig further stated that critics cite declining test scores, 
poor performance in international competitions and public dissatisfaction as measures of 
problems associated with public schools.  However, Henig noted that a higher pool of students 
took the SAT in the 1990s, the time when that assessment was the standard measure of academic 
performance, and especially true for minority students, a group which rose by 13 percent from 
1972 to 1991; with more students testing, scores tend to fall, exacerbated by the tendency of 
lower scores associated with underprivileged minority groups. He also noted that the white 
average SAT scores also fell by 10 points since 1976.  However, he explained that verbal scores 
have stabilized and math scores improved after 1984 (34).  Furthermore, high school 
standardized test scores as measured by the National Assessment Educational Progress also fell 
from 1969 to 1977, with 13 percent of 17 year olds considered functionally illiterate, 
representing three times the number for minorities (34).  But, those scores have modestly 
improved in the late 1980s, Henig noted (36).  Internationally, Henig quoted the Second 
International Mathematics Study, which compared American eighth and 12th graders to students 
from 20 other countries.  The study concluded that Americans were at the bottom 25 percent in 
geometry, but competitive in computational and other basic math, and advanced in algebra 
achievement (29).  However, in science in 1992, U.S. nine-year-olds performed well on the 
international science exam (Henig 39).  In terms of public dissatisfaction, the public has shown 
concern in letters to editors, refusal to provide funds, leaving public schools for private schools 
and answers on surveys.  Yet, when asked specifically about schools in their communities, 42 
percent of parents gave schools an “A” or “B,” compared to 21 percent giving schools an “A” or 
“B” in the nation (Henig 42).   
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 Henig argued against the market metaphor as an appropriate model for U.S. education 
because of the importance of equalizing opportunity. In that metaphor, “goods and services are 
provided most efficiently and at the highest quality in a market setting, where consumers can 
compare prices and quality and make informed decisions about how best to allocate the money 
they have available to spend” (57).  Yet, Henig stated that market forces and consumer choice in 
education have been associated with economic advantage and racial discrimination (58). Such 
economic advantage and racial discrimination has been discussed previously by the way most 
public K-12 public education is provided in our nation: higher housing prices in wealthier 
neighborhoods secure better school districts for those families living there; private schools may 
be accessed more easily by wealthier families; and lower-priced housing is located in 
neighborhoods that generally have a higher concentration of minority families, due to socio-
economic factors, who mostly have access to struggling K-12 public schools. 
Further, Henig challenged Milton Friedman’s 1960 charge that public schooling is 
inherently ineffective (58).  Henig said that Friedman contended in the 1960s that public schools 
operate as a monopoly, because most parents cannot afford private schools or are unable to move 
to other public jurisdictions.  According to Friedman’s argument, “the result is that public 
schools are free to do a poor job without fear of consequences. Even more disturbing, it would be 
economically irrational for them to expend the energy and resources that would be required to 
improve the education they provide” (Henig 59).  Friedman contended that although the 
government provides money for education through taxation, it should not provide oversight of 
schools (61).  Henig stated that Friedman’s argument concluded that education acquired from 
taxes should be used to minimally educate children, but not beyond.  An education voucher to 
educate children most years until graduation would be the correct solution (62).  However, Henig 
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summed up arguments against vouchers based on several constitutional, administrative, and 
overall societal concerns. Henig stated: “Although numerous objections to vouchers were raised, 
for the most part they fell into four types.  These involved concerns about separation of church 
and state, inequality, administrative feasibility, and impact on the public schools” (68). Besides 
vouchers to private and parochial schools, choice also has been manifested in other ways, such as 
integration through magnet schools and desegregation programs, Henig stated (107). Yet, Henig 
concluded that no firm evidence existed “as to the superiority of market forces over 
governmental authority, the process through which educational reforms are adopted is sure to be 
conflict-ridden and open-ended” (77). 
 No doubt, public education in the United States has many problems.  But, forming 
adequate solutions to the problems has left policymakers and education stakeholders in a 
quandary.  According to Chubb and Moe (1990), the very nature of public education, a 
bureaucratic machine riddled with mandates, has jeopardized the service of providing quality 
education.  Their solution, privatization, or putting education in the hands of the private market, 
is best. On the other hand, Henig (1994) stated that the privatization solution is extreme, because 
it exaggerates the problems of public education, leads to discrimination, and ignores the fact that 
public schools shape public interests as well as responds to them.  Furthermore, Henig has 
asserted that he is not sure whether privatizing education will yield predictable results as other 
societal factors should be considered.  
Summary  
There has been a movement toward more state and federal intervention in local schools to 
make them effective since the late 1980s, following the publication of A Nation at Risk, a federal 
study that cited poor performance of our nation’s schools. That movement eventually was 
29 
 
transformed from education dialogue and reform efforts geared toward excellence in education 
into a standards-based reform paradigm to achieve educational excellence. The standards-based 
reform paradigm was developed from 1989 until 1992 (Rhodes 2012, 70).  As the standards 
movement progressed, another more conservative and controversial element arose—private 
school choice at the center of improving schools (Rhodes 2012, 91). Although the standards 
movement with school choice at its core, centered on one goal—improving the nation’s 
schools—the movements culminated with the federal 2002 legislation, NCLB, which eventually 
became the focus of much criticism and failed to improve substantially our nation’s public 
schools, and, later, RTTT, which passed in 2009, whose results also did not substantially aid 
failing public schools. 
  The trends that have developed in education for more than 30 years have created major 
disputes in the academic literature about what effectiveness means and how we can get there.  
For example, Chubb and Moe (1990) argued that choice must be the wave of the future of public 
education in the United States because the market-based approach weeds out unsuccessful 
schools.  Also, they argued that all schools need the autonomy enjoyed by private schools, which 
have been free from federal, state and local control, and, thereby, have the ability to direct 
educational programs toward their targeted market, i.e., the families that choose their schools.  
The basic point that Henig (1994) is making is that empirically-based research must be must be 
balanced with an element of social analysis before conclusions are reached. 
Henig’s argument, considering social analysis as an important factor for developing 
education policy, has more merit than that of Chubb and Moe, who treat their solution, 
privatization, to the problems in education with a one-size-fits-all approach.  In other words, 
30 
 
Chubb and Moe’s solution, taking public schools out of the public realm and putting them in the 
private realm, or administering one solution, will solve all problems.  
Following that line of analysis led to the 2002 federal policy, NCLB, which passed under 
President George W. Bush’s administration, supported standards-based education reform as 
demonstrated by states developing assessments and requiring students to take them at certain 
grade levels, then using scores as a means to measure and diagnose the effectiveness of schools 
with the threat of losing federal funding for underachieving schools.  The federal approach to 
attempt to achieve excellence in K-12 public education, thereby, fit all of public school children 
in one box of measure without taking into consideration societal factors, such as socioeconomic 
levels, background, or experiences.  As we will see in chapter three, employing such a simplified 
approach to education policy threatened school accreditation for struggling schools.  Although 
the federal government attempted to achieve excellence within the K-12 public education system 
with the passage of NCLB, instead, some scholars say the effect of NCLB was that federal 
government challenged the states by issuing an unfunded mandate and further exasperated the 
problems of the K-12 public education system.  
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Chapter Three:  No Child Left Behind 
     As shown in chapter two, scholars disagree on the validity of the study, A Nation at 
Risk, published in 1983.  However, the end result of that study is that it moved the federal 
government into a more direct role in K-12 public education in our nation.  In fact, the study laid 
the foundation for dialogue, organization, and reform centering on how to achieve excellence in 
education, culminating the legislation No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2002 as the solution to 
the K-12 public education problem. 
This chapter will center on answering the question:  What did the authors of No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB) think they were doing?  In other words, what were the authors’ goals or 
intentions when developing NCLB?  Then the chapter discussed the passage of NCLB and policy 
analysis of the passage of NCLB.  Next, the chapter explored the success rate of NCLB.  Finally, 
the chapter examined support and criticism of NCLB. 
The Goals of No Child Left Behind 
The authors of NCLB attempted to get the states to do what it wanted, i.e., improving 
nationwide schools’ performance based on the measure of standards and accountability, by 
issuing consequences in the form of restricted funding to states that underperformed according to 
guidelines set by NCLB.  The authors clearly thought that their aggressive mandate would meet 
their main goal: improve the nation’s test scores, and, thereby, produce an environment of 
excellence in education that would spur the United States into becoming a worldwide leader in 
education quality.   
The authors of NCLB perceived the problem of K-12 public education to be the high 
achievement gap between White children and African American, Latino, and poor children.  
Indeed, research showed that at the time of the passage of NCLB, African American students 
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were reading and performing math in 12th grade at the same success rate that White children 
were performing in 8th grade. Lawmakers considered this to be unacceptable, a violation of equal 
opportunity, and a threat to U.S. future competiveness (Hess and Petrilli, 2004, 15). The 
explanation for the problem centered on lack of resources in needy schools, the effects of 
poverty, a dysfunctional school culture and a lax atmosphere of governance and incentives. 
Lawmakers were split on whether to address funding, but a consensus of agreement among 
Democrats and Republicans developed in the 1990s that poverty and incentives were areas that 
should be addressed. “Both Democrats and Republicans vehemently rejected the notion that 
poverty, culture or family background constituted legitimate explanations for mediocre student 
performance” (Hess and Petrilli 2004, 16).   
 A brief analysis of NCLB shows that many scholars have concluded that the federal 
legislation is an unfunded mandate, requiring states to set and meet annual measurable objectives 
or risk serious consequences.  According to the legislation, each state must develop challenging 
academic standards, a single statewide accountability system for all of its schools that ensures all 
schools make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), and use sanctions and rewards to hold its 
schools accountable for achieving AYP (NCLB, 1444-1446).  Furthermore, the law specified a 
timeline, marking the end of the 2001-2002 school year, and continuing 12 years, or until 2014, 
all students “will meet or exceed the State’s proficient level of academic achievement on the 
State assessments” (NCLB , 1448).  Finally, the law warned that if states fail to meet deadlines 
established by the Improving America’s School Act (IASA) of 1994 and requirements enacted in 
2001, then the secretary of education “may withhold funds for State administration” until the 
state fulfills the requirements as determined by the secretary of education (NCLB, 1457).  In 
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other words, states would lose vital federal funds, if they did not meet accountability measures 
for all children receiving public education. 
  Clearly, the authors of NCLB thought they were designing legislation to meet their main 
goal: improving the nation’s schools based on the measure of standards and accountability.  As a 
secondary goal, the authors of NCLB knew they would change the federal government’s role in 
education by pushing the federal government into the position as the key leader in education 
policy development and implementation.  Rather than the federal government playing a passive 
role in education policy by simply encouraging the states to identify troubled schools and 
assisting them with providing funding to help those schools as presented in the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), under NCLB, the federal government required states to 
develop standards and accountability measures and it issued consequences for states with failing 
schools, thereby, taking a more aggressive role.  The federal government, however, allowed 
some degree of choice by supporting states’ decisions to close failing schools.  
The NCLB legislation, called a landmark bill signed into law on Jan. 8, 2002, by 
President George W. Bush, was the most ambitious overhaul of ESEA to date. It allowed the 
president to deliver a major campaign promise in his first year of presidency after making 
education his centerpiece during his 2000 campaign.  “He (President George W. Bush) called for 
states to design and administer annual tests to measure student performance as a condition for 
receiving federal education money. Schools that repeatedly fell short of state-set standards would 
be subject to sanctions, such as being forced to divert a share of their federal funds to ‘vouchers’ 
to pay for private-schooling or tutoring for needy children. …The six-year bill authorized $26.3 
billion for assistance to elementary and secondary schools in fiscal 2002, an increase of $8 
billion over fiscal 2001” (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 2001).  
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However, NCLB demanded outcomes in the form of student achievement, did little to 
assist with that achievement, and affected schools with high numbers of minority and poor 
children more adversely by administering sanctions when those schools did not reach their 
achievement goals. Therefore, rather than achieving their main goal and assisting children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds by closing the achievement gap, NCLB actually accomplished the 
opposite, and hurt minority students in low achieving schools.  
The Passage of No Child Left Behind 
Robertson (2012) argued that the impact of “federalism—the division of government 
authority between the national government and the states—has shaped our nation because it has 
influenced all the important political battles in American history” (1).  Robertson further argued 
education policy as evident by the passage of NCLB in 2002 as well as many other areas of 
public policy, including policy relating to poverty, health and the environment, were addressed in 
ways during the 1990s and early 2000s resulting from a conservative governance during the 
1980s that replaced liberalism of the 1970s.  The conservative wave set forth by President 
Ronald Reagan, first elected in 1981, endorsed federalism, but used both centralization and 
decentralization to carry out its initiatives (148). 
State Initiatives that led to No Child Left Behind 
According to Robertson (2012), the conservative dominance encouraged a “resurgence of 
state policy leadership and policy innovation” (148).  Some state experiments during the early 
1980s consisted of the use of vouchers, or government certificates for education, to pay for 
public or private schools of the parents’ choice (148).  Other plans to increase performance and 
accountability included instituting pre-kindergarten programs in the 1970s, as noted in 
Minnesota and Missouri, and the ability to send students to schools in neighboring districts in 
Minnesota in 1987 (159).  In 1991, Minnesota also experimented with charter schools (159). The 
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state experimental methods continued with Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, in the 
1990s and early 2000s, who “sometimes used ‘waivers’ to encourage state experiments that 
would produce outcomes they favored. These state innovations allowed both liberals and 
conservatives to advance their goals, and in turn allowed state interests to influence major 
changes in Federal policy” (148).   Those state experiments eventually influenced the passage of 
NCLB in 2002.  
Starting in the mid to late 1980s, performance standards for schools became a part of 
school reform, following after the publication of A Nation at Risk, which “recommended new 
school curriculum standards, performance benchmarks, and accountability requirements” 
(Robertson 2012, 159).  Following that publication, Robertson (2012) stated the following: “The 
National Governors Association (NGA) made education a top priority, pressing for clearer state-
level goals and assessments” (159-160).  Thus, a state-led reform effort for public K-12 
education had begun.  
Development of President George W. Bush Administration’s Proposals 
 With a state-led reform effort in place, during the early 1990s, President George H.W. 
Bush, jumped on board to add momentum to the environment of education reform by 
announcing Goals 2000.  Robertson stated: 
The NGA endorsed the goals and added more. Democratic governors in 
Colorado and Oregon embraced the NGA standards, giving performance 
standards more credibility among liberals. By 2000, nearly all the states had 
established standards for English, mathematics, science, and social studies, 
assessed performance in eighth grade, and reported on district level achievement.  
Governor George W. Bush, for example, had implemented standards and 
assessment in Texas. 
These state innovations laid the foundation for No Child Left Behind. 
Bush, now president, proposed NCLB and won the support of liberal Senator 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA). To continue to receive Federal funding, states had to 
conduct annual assessments in mathematics and reading, to measure the yearly 
progress of students, and to take steps to close the racial achievement gap. States, 
not the Federal government, set the standards and the tests.  Schools that did not 
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meet state standards would continue to receive assistance, but after four years 
they would be subject to extensive restructuring. NCLB also required states to 
provide teacher certification standards and more choice options for parents.  
States were authorized to use funds for private, even for-profit entities (160).  
 
 Although the states, with their innovations centering on standards and 
accountability, created the environment for the passage of NCLB, the foundation for that 
law had be laid by the federal report, A Nation at Risk, which called for standards and 
accountability as a means to improve the nation’s public schools. By establishing and 
implementing standards and accountability within their borders, the states thought they 
were helping to eradicate any perception of a lax education environment.  However, the 
states were unaware that the federal government would latch on to their reform efforts 
and pass NCLB, legislation in which the federal government would mandate an 
improvement in public K-12 education as demonstrated by standards and accountability 
or risk losing federal funding.   
Congressional Hearings, Committee reports, Changes, and Votes 
 Although, for three years, Congress debated how far the federal government should 
influence education before the passage of the bill that eventually became the NCLB legislation in 
2002, the end result was its success. The main spearheads of the bill were Reps. John A. 
Boehner, R-Ohio, and George Miller, D-Calif, as well as Sens. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., 
and Judd Gregg, R-N.H. (Congressional Quarterly, 2001).  President George W. Bush had made 
education “the centerpiece of his 2000 presidential campaign and a top legislative priority of his 
new administration. …By mid-June (2001) both (the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. 
Senate) had passed versions of the ESEA reauthorization that required annual testing in reading 
and math in third through eighth grades, with rewards for the best schools and penalties for the 
worst.” Both (versions of the bill) tied progress to federal aid, and both turned GOP proposals for 
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open-ended block grants into pilot programs. Neither bill allowed for private-school vouchers—a 
proposal Bush abandoned after it became clear it could not win in either chamber” 
(Congressional Quarterly, 2001). The two versions of the bills were not reconciled over the 
summer of 2001, and with the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the completion of the bill seemed 
unlikely. However, leaders Boehner, Miller, Kennedy and Gregg, who were the chairmen and 
ranking member of each chambers’ education committees respectively, worked on differences in 
the two bills, whose final version was passed by the House on Dec. 13, 2001, and the Senate on 
Dec. 18, 2001 (Congressional Quarterly, 2001).  Here is a timeline of both versions of the bill: 
U.S. House of Representatives 
-May 9, 2001- The House Education and Workforce Committee 
approved bill to reauthorize ESEA by a vote of 41-7. “For Democrats’ support, 
Boehner agreed to a significant increase in authorized funding for education, 
including a doubling of Title I aid to poor schools over five years. Total ESEA 
funding would grow from $18 billion to $22 billion. Title I funding would rise 
from $8.6 billion in fiscal 2001 to $17.2 billion in fiscal 2006” (Congressional 
Quarterly, 2001). Another change in the bill was that states that got better 
academic results would not be able to spend federal funds for virtually any 
educational purpose, but up to 50 percent for other educational purposes, leaving 
existing programs intact (Congressional Quarterly, 2001). 
-May 23, 2001-The U.S. House of Representatives approved its 
reauthorization of ESEA by a vote of 384-45. The bill was in the same basic 
form as when it left committee, thus keeping the bipartisan support 
(Congressional Quarterly, 2001). 
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U.S. Senate 
-March 8, 2001-The Senate Health, Education. Labor and Pensions 
Committee approved bill to reauthorize ESEA by a vote of 20-0.  The bill was 
crafted while Republicans still had a majority in the Senate, and called for a 
seven-year reauthorization of ESEA.  “…Democrats persuaded Republicans to 
steer extra federal money to the neediest schools and give states an additional 
year—four years rather than three—to begin the new tests. The bill included $400 
million to help states develop the new exams” (Congressional Quarterly, 2001). 
-June 14, 2001-The U.S. Senate approved its bill to authorize ESEA 
by a vote of 91-8..  “‘The message is that help is on the way,” said Kennedy, who 
took over as the bill’s manager and remained on the Senate floor throughout most 
of the proceedings to preserve as much of a Democratic stamp as possible’” 
(Congressional Quarterly, 2001).  “The bill proposed authorizing $33 billion for 
ESEA programs in fiscal 2002, compared with $22.8 billion in the House bill. … 
The Senate agreed to authorize a $132 billion increase over 10 years to make sure 
Title I aid to poor schools reached all eligible children. … The Senate did adopt, 
by voice vote, an amendment by Gregg and Thomas R. Carper, D-Del, to 
authorize $125 million in grants to help communities that allowed children in 
underperforming schools to attend better public schools” (Congressional 
Quarterly, 2001).   
Conference/Final Action 
 After five months of work, the House and Senate members of conference agreed to a final 
version of the bill.  The six-year bill authorized $26.3 billion for assistance to public K-12 
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schools, totaling $3.5 billion more than the House proposed, but $5.4 billion less than the Senate 
proposed. The bill proposed $25 billion for Title I programs over five years until fiscal 2006. 
Members of the conference agreed to require states to “design and administer annual tests within 
four years or lose a small portion of federal money. … States had to set a standard test score for 
‘proficiency’ and get all children to that level in 12 years.  Schools that consistently failed to 
reach state goals would lose some federal money and much of their autonomy” (Congressional 
Quarterly, 2001).  “The bill made minor changes to formulas for computing grants for all school 
districts.  For instance, states that worked to distribute their own funds more equally throughout 
the state instead of using property tax-based formulas also would be eligible for targeted aid. 
…$1 billion in fiscal 2002 for targeted grants and $793 million for education finance incentive 
grants” was included (Congressional Quarterly, 2001).   
The Floor Vote 
  Congress overwhelmingly supported the passage of NCLB.  The U.S. Senate cleared the 
bill by 87-10 on Dec. 18, and the House of Representatives adopted it by 381-41 on Dec. 11 
(Congressional Quarterly, 2001).  Republicans supported the law 44-3 in the Senate and 183-33 
in the House. Democrats also showed great support as they backed the law 43-6 in the Senate 
and 198-6 in the House (Hess and Petrilli, 2004), 13).   
Reaction 
Tom Loveless (2006) stated that the passage of NCLB changed the federal government’s 
role in education by shifting its policies from “redistributive objectives” by allocating money for 
“supplies, personnel, curricula and other educational materials” to improve schools in poor 
communities, as with the practice under ESEA, and later, the 1994 reauthorization of ESEA 
under IASA, to policies that can be viewed as an incentive to receive federal money if desired 
outcomes—student achievement—is obtained. If student achievement falls short, as more 
40 
 
common in communities that have a high concentration of minorities and poor children, 
sanctions are administered, which can adversely affect children in those schools.  Loveless 
stated: “(Under ESEA), the theory was simple: more money produces better education, and high 
poverty schools need more money ….The theory of NCLB is different. Resources are viewed as 
incentives. In exchange for federal monies, local educators agree to produce certain outcomes. If 
they do not produce the promised outcomes, federal funding is cut off …The sanctions of 
NCLB—parental choice, supplemental services, reconstitution of schools—are components of 
the new incentive structure and do not produce new revenue streams. Schools that do not make 
adequate yearly progress with black, Hispanic, or poor children face the threat of these 
sanctions” (2).   
The passage of NCLB was explored by Patrick J. McGuinn (2006) who traced education 
policy from the passage of ESEA in the 1960s to the passage of NCLB in 2002.  The roots of 
NCLB, he argued, are in the educational reforms of the mid 1990s, but that NCLB was more 
comprehensive than any other policy and received support from both political parties.  In order to 
accomplish such a massive goal, McGuinn explained how the development of education policy 
over three decades and culminating with the passage of NCLB was due to an evolution of an 
education policy regime. 
First, he stated that ESEA laid the groundwork for the development of a policy regime 
(21).  Basically, the law responded to struggling schools by locating them and providing funds, 
but leaving control on the local and state levels—control that persisted through the 1970s and 
1980s.  By doing so, a policy paradigm was created, by the federal government offering support 
of the schools, but not controlling them (22).    
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But, McGuinn said that after the publication of the 1983 report, A Nation at Risk, the old 
policy paradigm was undermined as a new push for “standards, accountability, and choice began 
to emerge” (22). In fact, President George H.W. Bush’s 1988 campaign promoted him as the 
“education president” and, since then, presidents have jumped on the bandwagon and tried to 
turn campaign promises into legislation, despite opposition, sometimes from their own parties, so 
they could increase their electoral arena (22). However, McGuinn maintained that the education 
regime change was subtle as “guardians” of the old regime held on, especially as seen with 
Republicans who traditionally favor states’ rights.  On the other hand, Democrats, showed more 
enthusiasm for the regime change, but favored federal funding over standards, accountability, 
and choice (23).  In the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans gained control of both chambers of 
Congress, the first time in 40 years, a victory in which analysts have called an electoral 
realignment and education played a prominent role in the unification of the Republican campaign 
message (106).   
However, because their views were unpopular, Republicans lost the education issue, but 
education was considered a priority with amendments passed to Goals 2000: Educate America 
Act (107-109). Likewise, in the 1996 presidential election, education became a dominant issue 
with President Bill Clinton seeking a second term by running as a New Democrat, claiming to 
limit government, but help the disadvantaged.  His opponent Robert Dole, ran and lost on the 
theme, A New Contract, in which he argued that federal government was counterproductive 
(106).  McGuinn stated, “President Clinton and the Democrats had won a decisive victory in the 
rhetorical war over education by convincing citizens of the need for expanded federal spending 
and leadership.  As a result, in the late 1990s, Republicans dropped their proposals to eliminate 
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the U.S. Department of Education (DE), and to cut federal education spending, and put forward 
their own vision for federal educational leadership” (144).  
 McGuinn explained that the election of President George W. Bush in 2000 was a further 
step in the evolution of the new policy regime.  Because of Republican presidential defeats in the 
1990s, Bush opted against running a traditional conservative campaign (151).  McGuinn stated 
that “Bush emphasized his commitment to education by talking about the issue more than any 
other candidate, by putting forward a detailed education reform plan, and by visiting more than 
100 schools in the first 14 months of the campaign” (153). He also pointed to his reforms in 
Texas.  
To reiterate, within the first year of the first term of President George W. Bush’s tenure, 
Congress passed NCLB in 2001.  Frederick M. Hess and Michael J. Petrilli (2004) stated that 
NCLB thrust K-12 public education into a “new world of federal education leadership” (13). The 
authors called President George W. Bush a “cheerleader” for NCLB as when the president 
signed the bill into law on Jan. 8, 2002, he stated, “as of this hour, America's schools will be on a 
new path of reform, and a new path of results” (13).  Indeed, congressional members also 
overwhelmingly supported the law, as shown above.   
With the tremendous congressional support for the passage of NCLB and the signing of 
the law by President George W. Bush, the new education policy regime, a presidential-backed 
effort supported by both parties, finally was set in place.  The new policy regime had evolved 
over 30 years, starting with the passage of ESEA, which was dominated by interest-group and 
congressional actions, according to McGuinn.  However, the passage of NCLB was radically 
different as evident by the level of bipartisan support of the sweeping educational policy and a 
national accountability framework (194).   
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How No Child Left Behind Became A Law:  The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and 
Multiple Streams Model 
 
The goal of this section is to show how NCLB became a law. Specifically, the narration 
will show that Frank R. Baumgartner’s and Bryan D. Jones’ (2009) framework centering on the 
punctuated equilibrium model of policy change is relevant to the political development and 
passage of NCLB.  The model, as other models of policymaking, is based on the principles of 
incrementalism and negative feedback (9). 
First, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) argued that policy is managed by forming new 
institutions run by power elites, a practice that makes an area of policy appear to be stable as 
only incremental changes occur.  Indeed, from the time of the passage of ESEA in 1965 until the 
early 1980s, there were new forms of institutions—particularly developed in states’ departments 
of education— in charge of structuring and managing implementation as well as handling some 
federal incremental changes, creating an illusion of equilibrium run by power elites.  
However, second, Baumgartner and Jones argued that long-time institutions and political 
processes can be rapidly interrupted—action that can be understood with the agenda setting 
model (4).  The agenda setting model actually interrupts what may appear to have been a policy 
monopoly, “created by iron triangles, policy subsystems and policy networks” (5).   Many 
groups, which previously may not have had an interest in a problem, become interested in order 
to develop a knowledge base surrounding the problem; some say that interest promotes justice 
and critics say it harms the political environment by wasting resources (such as time and energy) 
(8).  The disadvantaged group’s interpretation of the problem may not be accepted readily and 
may encounter a fight with the advantaged group’s view that promotes the original position (8).  
The weak may win over the strong (9).  Media attention particularly is a necessary part of agenda 
setting (10).  As the media is focused on a problem, incrementalism is undermined as allocation 
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of attention to a problem is heightened, leading to periodic punctuations that disrupt temporary 
equilibrium (10).  Analyzing the political development of NCLB, we see that the attention 
brought forth by the 1983 publication of A Nation At Risk interrupted the policy monopoly set in 
place by ESEA; media attention on that report heightened attention to what some experts called 
an education problem.  The attention led to punctuations that disrupted the equilibrium.  As a 
result, subsystems and policy networks began to establish in late 1980s and 1990s, and education 
moved to the forefront of the agenda in the 1990s. During that time, we see disadvantaged 
groups converging with advantaged groups, particularly as the 2000 presidential election drew 
close.   
Third, Baumgartner and Jones argue that policy entrepreneurs look for an opportunity to 
push their initiative to the forefront of the agenda, or make sure it does not arrive (20).  
Sometimes, the issue has received so much media attention that it becomes too large to be 
confined to subsystems, and, as a result, political parties may embrace the issue in order to 
receive an electoral advantage (22).  The issue, of course, fits within the framework of the 
political party—Democrats who favor big government and “the less favored classes” and 
Republicans who favor less government and the “better off” (22).  The education issue received 
so much media attention that it was embraced by both political parties during the 2000 
presidential election. After President George W. Bush was sworn into office in 2001, education 
policy formation was one of the policies at the forefront of the agenda.  After 2002 when 
President Bush signed NCLB into law, the legislation reached a pinnacle of media attention a 
few years after adoption, which continued for several years. 
John Kingdon’s argument (2011) centering on how issues become issues during the 
agenda-setting process also is relevant to the adoption of NCLB.  Both the governmental agenda 
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and decision agenda will be explored here as a means to ascertain the relevance of Kingdon’s 
argument centering on coupling of problems and solutions during policymaking streams until 
they are put on the agenda at the precise moment a window of opportunity is opened.    
First, Kingdon stated that problem definitions are important to his analysis. He defined 
the word agenda in his research to mean “the list of subjects or problems to which government 
officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying 
some serious attention at any given time” (3).  He stated that the agenda process narrows 
“conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention” (3). In describing 
how the agenda is composed and changed overtime, Kingdon called big agenda items, such as 
budgetary decisions, as the governmental agenda, and the list of subjects within the 
governmental agenda as the decision agenda (4).  Additionally, Kingdon stated that a set of 
alternatives related to an agenda item is considered.  He described the coupling of problems and 
solutions as streams, such as the policy stream and political stream, including public mood, 
pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and 
changes of administration.  Finally, he stated policy windows are “the opportunities for action on 
given initiatives, present themselves and stay open for only short periods.  If the participants 
cannot or do not take advantage of these opportunities, they must bide their time until the next 
opportunity comes along” (166).    
In our analysis of NCLB, we see that Kingdon’s discussion is relevant.  First, we see that 
education within the governmental agenda centered on a major area on the decision agenda—
addressing poverty in education in the 1960s with the passage of ESEA.  Using Kingdon’s model 
further, we see that the governmental agenda of education changed over time from the decision 
agenda item of poverty to the agenda item of equality as seen in the 1970s as depicted by the 
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important legislation to address equality in education among the masses. Also, using his 
discussion, we see that as the agenda coupling the problems and solutions as streams, education 
actors emerging during that time to ensure that their groups were represented in the legislation. 
Finally, we see a policy window of opportunity opening in 1985, with the publication of A 
Nation At Risk to broaden the education decision agenda to achieving excellence in education, 
which eventually led the discussion of developing standards as measure of accountability, and, 
ultimately, the passage of NCLB in 2001 and the signing and implementation of the law in 2002. 
The Success Rate of No Child Left Behind 
Did NCLB actually accomplished its goals?  In other words, this section will analyze the 
key question:  Did NCLB do what its authors thought it was going to do?  If it were 
unsuccessful, what didn’t happen?  What did happen that they didn’t say they expected?  The 
research will show that the legislation failed to accomplish its goals and that many stakeholders 
and scholars nationwide criticized the legislation as being an unrealistic, unfunded mandate that 
led to many teachers and administrators unnecessarily losing their jobs.  
The Center On Education Policy (CEP), a nonprofit independent organization that has 
been monitoring Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) data since 2005, reported, although NCLB is 
legislation geared toward improving the nation’s schools, almost half of the states were unable to 
meet accountability goals as dictated through annual testing reported by AYP targets.  According 
to the CEP, schools that are not making AYP, actually increased over time.  The center reported 
that between 2006 and 2011, the national percentage of schools not making AYP increased from 
29 percent to 48 percent, an all-time high (5).   CEP issued the following report five years ago: 
· An estimated 48% of the nation’s public schools did not make AYP in 2011. 
This marks an increase from 39% in 2010 and is the highest percentage since 
NCLB took effect. 
47 
 
· In 24 states and the District of Columbia, at least half of the public schools did 
not make AYP in 2011. In a majority of the states (43 and D.C.), at least one-
fourth of the schools did not make AYP. 
· The percentage of public schools not making AYP in 2011 varied greatly by 
state, from about 11% in Wisconsin to about 89% in Florida. 
 
 The data, which are based on standards and performance levels increasing each year with 
every state having a different bar, clearly show the failings of NCLB. 
Other data show no real improvement in students’ test scores after the implementation of 
NCLB until 2009. Neal McCluskey and Andrew Coulson (2007) also concluded that there have 
been no real positive change in test scores during the early 2000s that could be attributed to 
NCLB. The authors stated that although several lawmakers and bureaucrats said in 2005 and 
2006, the law was successful, analysis of data show otherwise.  In July 2005 the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) released the report, Trends in Academic Progress. 
John Boehner (R-OH), then-chairman of the House committee on Education and the Workforce, 
said that academic achievement was on the increase. Former U.S. Secretary of Education 
Margaret Spelling said that reading and math scores were increasing and that the nation was 
closing the achievement gap in the nation’s public schools (2). In reality, however, McCluskey 
and Coulson said NCLB, which became law in 2002, had no impact on fourth-grade reading and 
scores, which did not change at all between 2002 and 2005, according to data (3).  They added 
that eighth-grade reading scores actually fell during the same period of time. Also, they pointed 
out that although fourth-grade and eighth-grade math scores rose between 2003 and 2005, the 
period that could be attributed to NCLB, the rate of increase after the passage of the law in 2002 
actually slowed.  In other words, they said that data show there was more growth in those scores 
between 2000 and 2003.  The authors stated: “At least according to NAEP scores since NCLB’s 
passage, it seems that the law has achieved nothing of consequence” (3). 
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Summarizing the NAEP data, Diane Ravitch (2009) stated that the fourth-grade reading 
gains from 2003 until 2007, after the implementation of NCLB were small, three points, but 
those gains were exactly the same gains from 1998 until 2003.  She further stated that fourth 
graders in the bottom 10th percentile had a five-point gain in scores after NCLB, but that did not 
compare to their 10-point gain from 2000 until 2002, before the law was effective.  She 
continued that eight-grade reading scores had no gains from 1998 until 2007, before and after 
NCLB. She also stated that gains in mathematics actually were better before the implementation 
of NCLB. Here is Ravitch’s summary of the mathematics scores:  From 2000 to 2003, fourth 
grade students gained nine points in mathematics, prior to NCLB, but from 2003 until 2007, after 
NCLB, fourth graders only gained five points. From 2000 until 2003, before NCLB, for fourth-
grade students in the lowest decile, there was a 13-point gain, but fourth graders saw a gain of 
only five points from 2003 to 2007.  In eighth-grade mathematics, gains also slowed after the 
passage of NCLB.  Eighth graders saw a five-point gain from 2000 to 2003, before NCLB, but 
only a three-point gain from 2003 to 2007. 
Not only did student test scores remain stagnant or fall after the implementation of NCLB 
in 2002, underachieving schools faced consequences in the form of replacing school staff 
members and replacing the principle.  The DE released in 2009 an update on its findings on Title 
I implementation, which is required under the NCLB law. According to the results,  in 2006–07, 
4 percent of Title I schools in their first year of being identified for improvement reported that 
they replaced staff members relevant to school’s low performance and 13 percent reported that 
they replaced the principal.  That same year, 11 percent of Title I schools in their second year of 
being identified for improvement reported that they replaced staff members relevant to the 
school’s low performance, while 24 percent reported they replaced the principal. Also, that year, 
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21 percent of schools in corrective action reported that they replaced staff members relevant to 
the school’s low performance, and 29 percent reported they replaced the principal. Finally, that 
year, 30 percent of Title I schools in restructuring reported that they replaced staff members 
relevant to the school’s low performance, while 40 percent reported that they replaced the 
principal (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). Clearly, jobs in teaching and administration in 
K-12 public education were affected by NCLB.  Unfortunately, as test scores decreased or 
remained stagnant after the implementation of NCLB (as the previous discussion of test score 
data showed), dire consequences for professionals in public education, in the form of losing their 
jobs, resulted. In other words, the ineffectiveness of NCLB created an atmosphere of instability 
and havoc for education professionals, without helping the students.  
Public Opposition to and Support of No Child Left Behind 
Within a few years after the implementation of NCLB, research showed that public 
support of and opposition to NCLB has produced peculiar demographics. Indeed, Loveless 
(2006) research showed that demographic data from a 2005 national poll revealed that support of 
and opposition to NCLB showed politically polarized opinions.  For example, Loveless stated 
that although the law was passed with bipartisan support, within a few years after 
implementation, criticism was divided among party lines, places of residence, race, and income 
earnings.  Loveless stated that the poll, conducted by the Education Testing Service (ETS) and 
analyzed by Peter Hart and Associates, showed that more Democrats were against NCLB, while 
more Republicans and Independents supported it. Also, suburban and urban residents were less 
likely to support the law than rural residents. In a surprising finding, the results on race and 
income deviated from party affiliation. Whites were more likely to oppose the law than Blacks 
and Hispanics, and people who made over $75,000 a year were more likely to oppose the law 
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than people who made under $75,000 a year. The race and income results are surprising as 
Republicans, who supported the law, generally tend to be White and earn higher incomes, but 
results indicated that Whites and people earning higher incomes opposed the law.  Furthermore, 
Democrats, who were against the law, generally tend to be Black and Hispanic and earn lower 
incomes, but results showed that Blacks and Hispanics and people with lower incomes supported 
the law (6-7).   
Other polls showed that support of the law varied according to sections of the law and 
how the questions were worded.  Loveless stated: “A 2004 poll by Americans for Better 
Education asked if the federal government should be able to hold states and local schools 
accountable to make sure student performance is improving, with results showing 71% said that 
it should and 25% said it should not. But support for the idea begins to drop when the question is 
worded differently, especially if the meaning of accountability is spelled out. In the 2005 Kappan 
Poll, for example, 68% say a single test cannot provide a fair picture of student achievement” 
(7).  
Loveless (2006) further showed in his research that states varied in their support of 
NCLB.  He stated: “States that tend to support NCLB are (Republican) states in presidential 
elections, score in the very bottom or top quartiles of National Assessment of Education Progress 
(NAEP), serve student populations that are more than 21.1% African-American or less than 
13.6% Hispanic, exhibit narrower than average black-white test score gaps, receive more than 
8.3% of K-12 revenue from the federal government, and are located in the South. States that are 
opposed tend to be (Democratic) states in presidential elections, fall in the middle quartiles of 
NAEP scores, have relatively small African-American or relatively large Hispanic populations, 
exhibit larger than average black-white test score gaps, receive less than 8.3% of K-12 revenue 
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from federal sources, and are located in the East, Midwest, or Western regions of the country” 
(22). Those results coincide with the results of the individual poll conducted by ETS mentioned 
above.  
Loveless correctly concluded that the peculiar politics of NCLB center on the formation 
of a political coalition and the dismantling of that coalition.  He said the law was guided through 
Congress by conservatives who promoted testing, accountability, and outcomes and liberals who 
liked the idea that big government was dedicated to equality in education and opportunity in 
education.  But, that coalition soon ended with both conservatives and liberals in opposition to 
the law.  
Organized and Scholarly Opposition to No Child Left Behind 
The states particularly voiced opposition to NCLB. The National Conference of State 
Legislatures Task Force on No Child Left Behind Final Report issued a statement criticizing 
NCLB, stating that the federal government rolled many state reforms into a single federal policy, 
and, by doing so, expanded federal role in K-12 public education administration.  The task force 
also stated the federal government undermined the 10th amendment by pitting that amendment 
against the spending clause of Article I, allowing the federal government to attach conditions to 
grants provided to states.  The task force cautioned that the U.S. Supreme Court has set 
constraints on the manner in which Congress can exercise its spending liberties in South Dakota 
vs. Dole and other decisions. “The Task Force is concerned that NCLB fails to meet two of the 
South Dakota vs. Dole tests: its grant conditions are not unambiguous and it uses coercion and 
not financial inducement to attain state participation” (2005).   
The task force also questioned methodology of data collection and measurement.  The 
data collection and measurement is accomplished through the use of AYP that relies on “year-to-
52 
 
year gains in standardized test scores as the primary measure of school quality and progress” 
(Mathis, 2006).  The state legislatures’ task force report further stated, “NCLB mandates that 
schools be evaluated by comparing successive groups of students against a static, arbitrary 
standard, not by tracking the progress of the same group of students over time. The AYP 
requirements constitute a “static” evaluation model because they hold all schools, regardless of 
demographic factors and prior achievement levels, to the same benchmark. Standardized tests are 
far from perfect measures of student achievement and function better in combination with other 
measures, such as student portfolios. The adequate yearly progress provisions are overly 
prescriptive and rigid” (2005). The task force’s opposition to NCLB is valid as academic 
literature support concerns about the legislation. 
Indeed, the shortcomings of NCLB are documented in the literature.  For example, some 
former bureaucrats who have worked in federal education policy development are not convinced 
that NCLB was the cure for America’s schools.  Hess and Petrilli (2004) discussed that 
Lawrence Uzzel, a former staff member of the federal education department, attacked NCLB for 
“virtually guaranteeing massive evasion of its own intent, ordering state education agencies to do 
things that they mostly don’t want to do” (3).  With such large congressional support for NCLB 
in 2001, it is surprising that by the presidential election in 2004, the NCLB political coalition had 
dissipated and much criticism had filled the political air. In fact, Democratic Presidential 
Candidate John Kerry accused President George W. Bush as withholding necessary funding for 
the law. Kerry stated that the president’s administration had left “funding for NCLB $27 billion 
short of the promised levels, literally leaving millions of children behind" (Hess and Petrilli, 
2004, 13). 
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  Also, teachers and administrators also criticized the law.  In 2005, Nel Noddings, 
president of the National Academy of Education and a faculty member at Columbia University's 
Teachers College, attacked NCLB.  She stated:  
  The No Child Left Behind Act is a bad law, and a bad law is not made 
better by fully funding it. The law employs a view of motivation that many of us 
in education find objectionable. As educators, we would not use threats, 
punishments, and pernicious comparisons to 'motivate' our students. But that is 
how the No Child Left Behind law treats the school establishment. The high-
stakes testing associated with the law seems to be demoralizing teachers, students, 
and administrators. … We should not waste more valuable resources—human and 
monetary—tinkering with this law. It is a bad law and should be repealed (Hess 
and Petrilli, 2004, 19). 
 
Reginia R. Umpstead (2008) addressed the unfunded mandate debate centered on NCLB 
and concluded that, although NCLB was not an unfunded mandate as it did not violate the 
conditional spending power of Article 1 Section 8 Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, “NCLB 
represents the most far-reaching manifestation of this powerful federal presence in an area that 
has, by both law and tradition been reserved to the states” (227). 
Criticism of NCLB has spanned other sectors of society. John R. Munich and Rocco E. 
Testani (2005) reported that federal funding is inadequate for implementation of NCLB, and 
resulted in the National Education Association (NEA) suing the Department of Education in 
2005. According to Munich and Testani, the case, School District of the City of Pontiac et al. v. 
Spellings, was the first major legal challenge to the education law to be filed in federal court.  In 
the case, nine districts in three states, Michigan, Ohio, and Kentucky, the NEA, and several of its 
affiliates filed suit against the DOE.  
 The lawsuit named then DE secretary, Margaret Spellings, as the defendant, on the 
grounds that federal funding was not provided to meet the requirements of the act, and, as a 
result, school districts were released from being required to follow the law. Munich and Testani 
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stated that the NEA had a case based on weak factors, including the following:  (1) states could 
simply refuse federal funding, and, thereby be exempt from the requirements of the act; (2) states 
did not show a real dispute, such as refusal of the federal government for a waiver from 
requirements of the act; (3) states did not show that they are injured by the law (stigmatizing 
teachers was a stretch in this area); and (4) states would be hard pressed to prove that they 
incurred additional expenses for student assessment and accountability as before NCLB was 
signed into law, the trend toward assessment and accountability was already in place.  
However, although the case was dismissed on the district level, a panel of the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision in 2008 on the grounds that federal 
notice to states and school districts regarding the fact that compliance to the law may require 
additional funds was not provided by the federal government.  In a letter written by Spellings, 
she disagreed with the decision. She stated:  
 “In concluding that there was not clear notice to states and school 
districts, the court relied on its interpretation of the so-called "unfunded mandates 
provision" in section 9527(a) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA), as amended by NCLB.  
“I strongly disagree with the Sixth Circuit's decision and am exploring all 
legal remedies to overturn the decision. NCLB is not an unfunded mandate but 
rather a compact between a state and the federal government that asks the state 
and its school districts, in exchange for receiving substantial federal dollars, to 
demonstrate results. This investment in our children is creating opportunities for 
every child in America to have access to a high quality education” (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2008). 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth District Court agreed with Spellings and 
reversed the district court’s decision in 2009 (United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit, 
2009). Although the DE secured a victory in the end, the conflict showed the lack of support for 
NCLB by a prominent teachers’ union.  
55 
 
Pedro A. Noguera (2004) criticized NCLB as a quick fix to the nation’s education woes. 
He stated that although politicians, journalists, corporate leaders and other reformers in the field 
of education supported NCLB as the “medicine” that the field needed, they neglected to realize 
that many students would be the losers in the end.  For example, he cited thousands of students in 
Massachusetts, Texas, Florida and California, who were facing denial of high school diplomas in 
what many called a grave injustice to students who live in impoverished districts.  Rather than 
returning to the past when there were no standards, he stated that states should do more to assist 
struggling schools and accountability standards should be broadened to include more than just 
test scores.   
Michele McNeil (2010) stated that “seven leading civil rights groups, including the 
NAACP and the National Urban League, called on then U.S. Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan to dismantle core pieces of his education agenda,” citing school choice and school 
dismantling as major reasons (1). The group called its agenda, the Opportunity to Learn 
campaign, which “is reminiscent of a similar push during the failed national standards movement 
of the 1990s. In both cases, the emphasis is not just on common standards that students, teachers, 
and schools should meet, but common inputs—such as money, good teachers, and a college-
bound curriculum—that should be provided” (1). 
Rather than improving the nation’s schools, McCluskey and Coulson (2007) said NCLB 
actually produced negative unintended consequences.  To understand those consequences, the 
authors stated it is important to understand the politics behind the passage of the law.  They 
stated that the law was passed by Republicans who traditionally are against federal involvement 
in education to a large extent, but who were attracted to NCLB because it called for 
“proficiency,” but left the establishment of proficiency standards in the hands of the states (6).  
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Also, it was passed by Democrats, who have strong ties to teachers’ unions, school 
administrators and civil rights groups, all of whom discourage rigorous standards because they 
do not want to punish schools with high concentrations of minorities who may not be able to 
meet those standards due to socio-economic concerns. The authors pointed out that those groups 
of Democrats, however, generally desire federal funding for those minority populations. As a 
result, the authors asserted that, because of a collision of interests, NCLB was passed with states 
in control of standards, but with federal funding backing states who meet their standards.  The 
authors, as a result, accused the states of setting as low standards as possible (6).  The authors 
concluded:  “ The evidence and analysis presented here make it clear that the federal government 
has no proper role in American education beyond enforcing civil rights laws. Moreover, neither 
federal interventions in general nor NCLB in particular have lived up to the expectations set out 
for them” (15). 
Dorie Turner (2012) reported that NCLB had been up for renewal since 2007 (before the 
passage of ESSA last year), but, although federal lawmakers agreed the law needed to be 
changed, they disagreed on how to accomplish that goal.  As a result, eight states had been 
approved for waivers from the law (1).   Three years later, Alyson Klein (2015) reported that 42 
states and the District of Columbia, holding waivers from certain provisions of NCLB, would 
like to renew the flexibility for up to four more years.  
Ravitch (2009) concluded:  “It is time to pull the plug on No Child Left Behind. It has 
had adequate time to prove itself. It has failed. After seven years of trying, there is no reason to 
believe that the results of NCLB will get dramatically better. Now is the time for fundamental 
rethinking of the federal role in education.” 
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Summary 
Research clearly shows the flaws and shortcomings of NCLB. The research has shown 
that what actually happened was that local administrators and teachers, whose voice was 
minimized during the development process, felt trapped as they tried to meet the unrealistic, 
unfunded mandate that NCLB unveiled.  Clearly, the authors of NCLB did not expect the high 
number of firings of teachers and administrators in Title I schools. The legislation had been up 
for renewal from 2007, but legislators were in disagreement on how to fix the problem, until, 
finally, they reached agreement in 2015 with the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA).   
President Obama signed into law ESSA in 2015.  The law, while requiring state 
assessments, accountability measures and instruments, and AYP attainment, it does provide 
funding to help states meet desired goals. (“Every Student Succeeds Act” www.ed.gov/ESSA).  
The effectiveness of that piece of legislation is yet to be determined as it is too early.  But, the 
groundwork leading to the passage of ESSA had been set after the passage of NCLB when the 
research shows criticism of NCLB and a departure from it with the passage of RTTT in 2009.  
Chapter four will examine the origin creation, groundwork, goals, passage, and policy analysis of 
RTTT.  
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Chapter Four: Race To The Top 
 
President Barack Obama, acutely aware of the negative educational climate created by 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB), promptly acted on a campaign promise in January 2009 by 
attempting to help state departments of education financially create a climate of educational 
excellence. His solution was termed Race to the Top (RTTT).  As a grants reward program, 
RTTT provided a creative avenue for states to gain federal educational funding to meet the 
criteria set by NCLB, which by 2009, seemed like an unfunded mandate for student 
performance.  Although RTTT only proposed to help schools meet Adequate Yearly Progress 
(AYP) goals set by NCLB at only a slightly greater rate, it did offer states an opportunity to gain 
additional resources to strive toward meeting desired policy goals directed toward achieving 
excellence in education. This chapter answers the question:  What did the authors of RTTT think 
they were doing?  The chapter outlines the origin, creation, groundwork and goals of RTTT. 
Furthermore, the chapter reviews the program and offers a comparison of a state application that 
won a RTTT grant and a state application that was not approved for a grant.  Finally, the chapter 
summarizes the passage and policy analysis of the legislation. 
The Origin, Creation, Groundwork and Goals of Race To The Top 
Clearly, the authors of RTTT thought they were offering financial relief from the lack of 
funding needed to meet educational outcomes set forth in NCLB, which had left many state 
departments of education weary as they tried to meet the guidelines of the legislation without 
additional financial resources.  Rather than issuing a mandate, RTTT substantially modified the 
legislation by offering a voluntary grants reward program without any imposition of penalty to 
states.  Under RTTT guidelines, the states were given an option to choose to be a part of the 
grants reward program by submitting a plan that met federal guidelines in place to help create an 
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environment for education improvement, and that won over other states’ applications.  States 
competing for a RTTT grant particularly had to show improvement in the following areas:  
school assessments; efforts to recruit, prepare and develop effective teachers and principals; data 
systems to measure student growth and success; and turn-around of their lowest-achieving 
schools (“Race to the Top Program Executive Summary,” 2009, U.S. Department of Education, 
2).   
To understand the origin, creation and groundwork of RTTT, it is important to answer the 
following question:  What was the political crisis when RTTT was created?  With the election of 
President Obama in 2008, education policy actors saw an opportunity to push for monetary 
support to aid states as they attempted to create a climate of educational excellence within their 
borders.  Shortly after being sworn in office in January 2009 in the midst of an economic 
recession, President Obama signed on Feb. 17, 2009, into legislation the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which included $53.6 billion earmarked for the U.S. Department of 
Education (DE) to assist and improve all levels of our nation’s schools.  RTTT, a $4.35 billion 
grants reward program, was a part of that stimulus package  
(“American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,” 2009, 111th U.S. Congress). 
 ARRA was created to offer economic assistance and promote economic recovery.  The historic 
legislation was “designed to stimulate the economy, support job creation, and invest in critical 
sectors, including education.”  The ARRA included a provision for $4.35 billion for RTTT 
funds, defined as “a competitive grants program designed to encourage and reward States that 
are creating the conditions for education innovation and reform”.  The grants program awarded 
states for specifically achieving significant improvement in making substantial gains in the 
following areas:  student achievement; closing achievement gaps; improving high school 
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graduation rates; and ensuring student preparation for success in college and careers (“Race to 
the Top Program Executive Summary,” 2009, U.S. Department of Education, 2).  Clearly, RTTT 
was created to offer financial assistance to states that developed unique programs to meet desired 
educational outcomes, and, thereby, departed from NCLB, which offered no financial support to 
achieve desired outcomes.  
President Obama unveiled RTTT to the public in July 2009.  The overall goal of 
the four-year grants program, which ended in 2014, was to improve the nation’s K-12 
public schools.  According to President Obama’s administration, RTTT’s goal is “to reshape 
America’s educational system to better engage and prepare our students for success in a 
competitive 21st century economy and workplace.  Designed to incentivize excellence, 
spur reform, and promote the adoption and use of effective policies and practices, the 
Race to the Top is a comprehensive vision for school reform …” (“Fact Sheet:  The Race 
to the Top,” 2009, White House,1).  An important key to the grants reward program was 
that states were given a leadership role as they were offered an incentive to improve and 
reform, rather than being issued a one-size-fits-all unfunded mandate, as in the case of 
NCLB, which, although that legislation allowed states to develop their own turnaround 
programs, it also penalized states for falling short of desired outcomes.  Quoting the DE, 
Elaine Weiss (2014) stated that the overall goal of RTTT was that states and districts 
“will offer models for others to follow and spread the best reform ideas across the states 
and across the country” (60). 
 States were given similar latitude to develop their own programs to achieve desired 
outcomes in RTTT as in the case of NCLB, but, in RTTT, they were given broad categories by 
which to set their goals in order to obtain points. Weiss (2014) offered the following summary of 
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categories:  “develop teacher  (and principal) evaluation systems that rely on measures of student 
achievement and growth; strengthen teacher preparation programs and improve access to and 
quality of professional development programs; identify alternative routes to certification to 
remove barriers to teaching for potentially strong teachers who might be impeded by existing 
systems or processes; and identify and turnaround lowest performing schools using one of 
several strategies along the lines of federal school improvement grants, including firing the 
principal and/or much of the staff, turning the school over to a charter or other outside manager, 
or closing it altogether (60-61).”  
 All 50 states and the District of Columbia were eligible to apply and compete for RTTT 
grants.  The DE provided training on writing applications, determined which policies would be 
awarded, how much states would receive, how many states would receive awards, what amount 
the awards would be, and oversight for compliance (Howell 2015).  
The grants reward program included three phases of competition.  Phase 1 and Phase 2 
included “specific education policy priorities on which each applicant would be evaluated.” 
Those policy priorities were included in several scoring categories that were assigned points.  
The categories and points are following: (1) state success factors, including state’s education 
agenda, “raising achievement and closing gaps, and advancing standards and assessment,” 125 
points; (2) standards and assessments, including “developing common core standards and high-
quality assessments,” 70 points; (3) data systems to support instruction, including ‘instituting a 
longitudinal data systems and using data to improve instruction,”47 points; (4) great teachers and 
leaders, including “providing a high quality pathway for aspiring teachers and principals, 
improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance, and improving teacher and 
principal preparation programs,” 138 points; (5) turning around the lowest-achieving schools, 50 
62 
 
points; (6) general, including “successful conditions for high-performing charter schools,” 55 
points; and (7) competitive preference priority, including providing “a rigorous course of study 
in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) subjects,”15 points (Howell 
2015).  
For Phase 1, 40 states and the District of Columbia submitted RTTT applications.  On 
March 10, 2010, the DE announced two winners, Tennessee winning $500 million, which was 10 
percent of its yearly state education budget, and Delaware winning $120 million, or about 5.7 
percent of its yearly state budget (Howell 2015). 
For Phase 2, 35 states and the District of Columbia submitted RTTT applications.  On 
Aug. 24, 2010, the DE announced that 10 winners were awarded Phase 2 funding.  The winners 
and amounts of funding are following: (1) Florida, $700 million; (2) New York, $700 million; 
(3) Georgia, $400 million; (4) North Carolina, $400 million; (5) Ohio, $400 million; (6) 
Maryland, $250 million; (7) Massachusetts, $250 million; (8) The District of Columbia, $75 
million; (9) Hawaii, $75 million; and (10) Rhode Island, $75 million (Howell 2015). 
After exhausting the original RTTT funds, for Phase 3, Congress allocated additional 
funds. Only losing finalists from Phase 2 could participate. Phase 3 grant amounts were 
significantly smaller than those awarded in the first two phases. On December 23, 2011, the DE 
announced the following seven winners and grant amounts for Phase 3 winners: (1) Illinois, $43 
million; (2) Pennsylvania, $41 million; (3) New Jersey, $38 million; (4) Arizona, $25 million; 
(5) Colorado, $18 million; (6) Kentucky, $17 million; and (7) Louisiana, $17 million (Howell 
2015). 
The substantive work began after states received their grants, including DE monitoring to 
help ensure that states met goals and timelines.  A vital component was that meeting those 
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objectives was contingent on final disbursement of funds. “States that won Race to the Top 
grants were subject to a nontrivial monitoring process, complete with annual performance 
reports, accountability protocols, and site visits. After receiving an award letter, a state could 
immediately withdraw up to 12.5 percent of its overall award. The remaining balance of funds, 
however, was available to winning states only after (DE) received and approved a final scope of 
work from the state’s participating local education agencies. Each winning state’s drawdown of 
funds, then, depended upon its ability to meet the specific goals and timelines outlined in its 
scope of work” (Howell 2015). 
The adoption of RTTT revealed that the grants reward program had impact, not only on 
the states that won, but also on those states that were not winners. In the aftermath of the grants 
reward program, many states nationwide adopted relevant education reform measures that 
actually fit RTTT criteria.  Those reforms include “charter schools, data management, 
intervention into low performing schools, and use of test scores for school personnel policy.” 
Other control policies also were tracked, including “increased high school graduation 
requirements, the establishment of 3rd-grade test-based promotion policies, and tax credits to 
support private school scholarships” all similar to RTTT policies but were neither mentioned nor 
rewarded under the program (Howell 2015). 
States that completed applications, but did not receive RTTT grants showed lacking 
elements in their applications as demonstrated by some negative comments from RTTT 
evaluators. For example, evaluators stated that Missouri’s application lacked a narrative showing 
commitment, although the state provided a summary table of data showing commitment in the 
area, “State Success Factors,” within the category, “Articulating States Education Reform 
Agenda and Local Education Agency’s (LEA’s) Participation.” Missouri’s score for that 
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category showed a loss of considerable points, 46 out of 65. Also, evaluators stated that 
Missouri’s application lacked in the same area, “State Success Factors,” but this time, within the 
category, “Demonstrate Significant Progress In Raising Achievement and Closing Gaps.” The 
evaluator wrote, “The impact on standards and assessments is not addressed nor were there data 
clarifying the number of people served by the Learning Center or the number of low performing 
schools where progress has been made.” Evaluators scored Missouri’s application low in that 
area as well, and the state received 15 out of 30 points (U.S. Department of Education, States’ 
Applications for Phase 2). 
In contrast, a winning application was strong across nearly all categories. For example, 
Florida’s application received high marks in the area, “State Success Factors,” within the 
category, “Articulating States Education Reform Agenda and Local Education Agency’s 
(LEA’s) Participation.” Evaluators wrote, “The FL (Florida) application offers a clear and 
ambitious agenda, tightly organized around the four federal reform areas.” Florida’s application 
received 59 out of 65 points in that category.  Likewise, in the same category, “State Success 
Factors,” but this time, within the category, “Demonstrate Significant Progress In Raising 
Achievement and Closing Gaps” evaluators scored Florida particularly high as well, and wrote, 
“The application provides a concise and convincing table with accompanying text that 
demonstrates a strong state commitment (including STEM activities) and progress in the past 
several years across the four reform areas.” Florida earned a score of 28 out of 30 points in that 
category. 
RTTT’s qualifying criteria and the control policies that have helped reformed state 
departments of education actually were not created overnight. In fact, the role of markets and 
interest groups had a profound effect on the origin of RTTT. According to Catherine R. Barnes 
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(2011) in the article, “RTTT Only Benefits Big Government,” the national standards found in 
RTTT were developed by the National Governors Association (NGA) and Council of Chief State 
School Officers (CCSSO). Barnes continued that “the NGA and the CCSSO launched in April 
2009 their Common Core Standards Initiative that became the basis of the $4.35 billion RTT 
Program." 
 Additionally, the origin of RTTT must be reviewed in context of the overall framework 
of NCLB.  As the prevailing federal education policy, NCLB’s requirements still were in place, 
but the federal department of education issued waivers to states that showed plans to meet 
criteria set forth in RTTT.  In the article, “8 states get waiver from ‘No Child Left Behind,’” the 
Associated Press (2012) reported a total of 19 states received waivers. The reason for the waivers 
was to offer states flexibility to develop unique education programs, according to then U.S. 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.  “These states are getting more flexibility with federal 
funds and relief from NCLB’s one-size-fits-all mandate in order to develop and implement 
locally tailored solutions to meet their unique educational challenges,” Duncan said (1).  By 
articulating that states have different local populations of students, and, therefore, different needs 
to successfully educate their children, Duncan highlighted a major flaw in the NCLB policy, 
which offered states little flexibility in their plans. By giving states waivers from plans 
developed under NCLB and greater flexibility to develop new, locally-tailored education 
programs showed how the federal education department’s goal was to create and promote a new, 
more flexible education environment under the RTTT program.   
To understand the groundwork of RTTT, it is important to describe President Obama’s 
use of federalism.  In an article, “Inflection Point?  Federalism and the Obama Administration,” 
Timothy Conlan and Paul Posner (2011) examined President Barack Obama’s “hybrid model of 
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federal policy innovation and leadership.”  The scholars painted the dire conditions of the 
economy that President Obama inherited upon the onset of his first term as president, and, as a 
result, they stated that the president quickly used the federal government’s role to alleviate 
financial distress, going beyond the normal limits of centralization to reach corporations, states, 
local schools, among other areas. In describing the state of the nation during late 2008 when 
President Obama was elected and early 2009 when he was sworn into office, the authors stated:  
When Barack Obama was inaugurated on January 20th, 2009, the US 
economy had been in recession for more than a year, the financial system was still 
teetering near the brink of collapse, and jobs were being lost at an accelerating rate 
each month. In short, the new president was faced with the worst economic crisis 
since the 1930s, and the effects on public sector finances were staggering. Federal 
revenues had declined 18% percent –or $463 billion-- from FY 2007 to FY 2009, 
and revenues are not estimated return to FY 2007 levels until 2011. State tax 
revenues fell an average of 11.8% from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2010, with 
state income tax revenues collapsing by more than 20% in nearly a dozen states.  
On the expenditure side, the recession caused spending for safety net programs 
like Medicaid and unemployment benefits to rise, and such expenditures were 
reinforced by the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) enacted in 
October 2008. As a result, the federal budget deficit grew to $459 billion in fiscal 
year 2008, which ended in September of that year, and the projected deficit for 
2009 bequeathed by President George W. Bush to President Obama was estimated 
in January 2009 to be $1.2 trillion.  In short, President Obama inherited the most 
challenging fiscal and economic situation of any new president since Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (4-5).  
 
Because of the “complexity and nuance of the economy” in 2008 and 2009, and 
because he relied on his “own style and intellect,” President Obama went beyond 
centralization to develop a comprehensive plan to restore the economy, Conlan and 
Posner stated.  The scholars said, “The scope and reach of initiatives is truly breathtaking, 
including the largest economic stimulus package since the New Deal, comprehensive 
health care reform, major financial reform, climate change regulations, and substantial 
new investments in new energy, health care, and transportation technologies. In short, 
Obama’s initiatives represent the most ambitious domestic policy agenda since LBJ’s 
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Great Society. Moreover, like the Great Society’s ―creative federalism, all rely heavily 
on state and local governments for effective implementation, and many seek to emulate 
Johnson’s emphasis on accomplishing reform by using federal grant programs to drive 
innovation and change at the state and local levels” (5). 
As shown above RTTT was created to help struggling schools in order to provide 
financial assistance to improve the performance of K-12 public education nationwide. To 
reiterate, the overall goal of the grants reward program was to offer an economic incentive 
for schools to develop new locally, tailored programs to achieve excellence in education 
throughout our nation’s K-12 public schools.   
The Passage of Race To The Top 
The research shows that RTTT was adopted as a solution for states’ departments of 
education to gain financial strength to help them through the economic recession and assist with 
the overall objective of NCLB—improving our nation’s schools as documented through meeting 
AYP. NCLB was up for renewal in 2007, but Congress was at a standstill in regards to its 
improvement.  However, a summary of the bill, H.R.648, considered by the 110th Congress, 
2007-2008, showed that the climate of NCLB was unfavorable.  The bill, called the No Child 
Left Behind Improvements Act of 2007, was introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives on 
Jan. 23, 2007, but did not move beyond the House.  It called for the following: 
No Child Left Behind Improvements Act of 2007 - Amends the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) to alter requirements 
for adequate yearly progress (AYP) assessments of student groups by: (1) 
allowing states to vary the number of students sufficient for such an assessment 
from local educational agency (LEA) to LEA and from school to school; (2) 
lowering the percentage of students in a failing group who must show 
improvement from the preceding year for a school to avoid corrective action; (3) 
changing the method of counting students in more than one group; (4) allowing 
states to use alternative methods of defining AYP; (5) exempting a higher 
percentage of students from such assessments; (6) giving states greater flexibility 
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in the use of alternative assessments for disabled students and those not proficient 
in English; and (7) allowing multiple assessments of the same student prior to the 
following school year and measurement of the achievement of students as if they 
were in their prior grade (H.R. 648, 110th U.S. Congress, 2007). 
The requirements from the bill clearly show a departure in the one-size-fits-all approach 
to NCLB.  Given that the political climate was unfavorable for NCLB in 2007, the 2008 political 
campaign offered an opportunity to talk about changes to the law.  
Another example of the unfavorable climate produced by NCLB is a summary of the bill, 
H.R.6239, considered by the 110th Congress, 2007-2008, called NCLB Recess Until 
Reauthorization Act, which was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on June 11, 
2008.  It also did not move beyond the House. It called for the following:  
Amends the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to suspend, 
during the 2008-2009 school year, new identifications of schools or local 
educational agencies as needing: (1) improvement, after they fail to make 
adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward state academic performance standards for 
two consecutive years; (2) corrective action, after they fail to make AYP for an 
additional two years after being identified as needing improvement; or (3) 
restructuring, after they fail to make AYP after a year of corrective action.  
Lifts such suspension on the earlier of the last day of the 2008-2009 
school year or the authorization of FY2009 appropriations for title I (Improving 
the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged) of the Act. (H.R. 6239, 110th 
U.S. Congress, 2008).  
 
 Clearly, the U.S. House of Representatives attempted to respond to the public by taking 
action on measures that would offer relief to NCLB.    
Race To The Top:  The Punctuated Equilibrium Framework of Policy Development and 
Multiple Streams Model of Policy Development  
 
Specifically, the narration of the passage of RTTT shows that Frank R. Baumgartner’s 
and Bryan D. Jones’ (2009) framework centering the punctuated equilibrium model of policy 
change is relevant to the political development and passage of RTTT.   
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First, Baumgartner and Jones argue that new policy is managed by forming new 
institutions run by power elites, a practice that makes an area of policy appear to be stable as 
only incremental changes occur.  Indeed, from 2002 when NCLB was passed until about 2006 
when the deadline for the law’s renewal drew near, there were new forms of institutions—
particularly developed in states’ departments of education—in charge of structuring and 
managing implementation as well as handling some federal incremental changes, creating an 
illusion of equilibrium run by power elites.  
However, second, Baumgartner and Jones argue that long-time institutions and political 
processes can be rapidly interrupted—action that can be understood with the agenda setting 
model (4).  The agenda setting model actually interrupts what may appear to have been a policy 
monopoly, “created by iron triangles, policy subsystems and policy networks” (5).   Many 
groups, which previously may not have had an interest in a problem, become interested for a 
typical reason—understanding the policies—a reason some say promotes justice to critics who 
say it harms the environment with problems such as wasting resources (8).  The disadvantaged 
group’s interpretation of the problem may not be accepted readily and may encounter a fight 
with the advantaged group’s view that promotes the original position (8).  The weak may win 
over the strong (9).  Media attention particularly is a necessary part of agenda setting (10).  As 
the media is focused on a problem, incrementalism is undermined as allocation of attention to a 
problem is heightened, leading to periodic punctuations that disrupt temporary equilibrium (10).   
Indeed, as shown by the political development of RTTT, although many of those NCLB 
established institutions have remained in place until present, starting about 2006, public interest 
groups, scholars and other stakeholders began pressuring congressional leaders to amend or 
substantially modify the law, and, thereby, secured media attention.  When public officials were 
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under media pressure to turn their attention to amending or substantially modifying NCLB, 
interest groups had created an atmosphere ready for political change. 
Third, Baumgartner and Jones argue that policy entrepreneurs look for an opportunity to 
push their initiative to the forefront of the agenda, or make sure it does not arrive (20).  
Sometimes, the issue has received so much media attention that it becomes too large to be 
confined to subsystems, and, as a result, political parties may embrace the issue in order to 
receive an electoral advantage (22).  The issue, of course, fits within the framework of the 
political party—Democrats who favor big government and “the less favored classes” and 
Republicans who favor less government and the “better off” (22).  In our RTTT example, the 
issue of modifying NCLB had become so large that it became an issue of political parties during 
the 2008 presidential election.  Indeed, the campaign and election of President Obama in 2008 
created an opportunity for education policy entrepreneurs to push their initiative, a substantial 
modification of NCLB, to the forefront of the agenda using the political parties. Our RTTT 
example shows the 2009 swearing in office of President Obama further solidified the political 
environment for a policy punctuation as shown by President Obama’s early action—the July 
2009 unveiling of RTTT, which, actually was included in that year’s stimulus package, passed in 
February 2009.  
In summary, the research clearly shows that the political development of RTTT can be 
seen as a classic case embedded in the punctuated equilibrium model of policy development.  
The development of the policy also can be framed in the Multiple Streams Model 
of Policy Development.  Indeed, in our analysis of NCLB, we see that John Kingdon’s 
(2011) discussion is relevant.  First, we see that education within the governmental 
agenda centered on a major area on the decision agenda—developing relief from NCLB 
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from 2005.  Using Kingdon’s model further, we see that the governmental agenda of 
education changed overtime from the decision agenda item substantially modifying the 
legislation to give quick relief from the grip of the legislation. Also, using his discussion, 
we see that as the agenda coupling the problems and solutions as streams, education 
actors emerging during that time to ensure that their groups were represented in the 
legislation. Finally, we see a policy window of opportunity opening in 2008, with the 
election of President Obama, and, ultimately, the passage of RTTT within the bounds of 
ARRA in 2009.  
Criticism of Race To The Top 
Although RTTT was developed to help financially strapped states’ departments of 
education during the economic recession of 2008 meet education requirements, some scholarly 
criticism arose during the time of its passage. Grover J. “Russ” Whitehurst (2010) stated in an 
article of opinion, “Did Congress Authorize Race to the Top?” that the text of the ARRA, 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the America Competes Act (ACA), does 
“not authorize, require or suggest” the very specific language found in RTTT.  Whitehurst said 
that the ARRA, ESEA and ACA does not specifically say “that states competing for funds would 
need to adopt common state standards, create more charter schools, evaluate teachers and 
principals based on gains in student achievement, emphasize the preparation of students in 
careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, or restructure the lowest 5 percent 
of their schools. Yet, (within) the grant program the administration designed to implement the 
provisions of the ARRA, the education department’s Race to the Top initiative, included each of 
these policy priorities, and states had no chance of winning unless their applications were built 
around them” (Education Week).  
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According to two national daily newspapers, the passage of RTTT received some 
negative feedback from the start from some interest groups and officials, while others were more 
neutral.  
In the article, “Obama Uses Funding to Pressure Education Establishment for Change,” 
Michael Shear and Nick Anderson explained potential obstacles to RTTT when President Obama 
was set to unveil the incentive program.  One potential obstacle was whether teachers’ unions, a 
group that had previously endorsed President Obama, would embrace the incentive program. The 
authors compared RTTT with NCLB, a law in which President George W. Bush did not consider 
teachers’ unions during the formation stages. They quoted President Obama who stated, "There 
are going to be elements within the teachers’ union where they're just resistant to change, 
because people inherently are resistant to change.  Teachers aren't any different from any 
politicians or corporate CEOs. There are going to be certain habits that have been built up that 
they don't want to change." They further quoted President Obama who stated, “What we’re 
saying here is, if you can’t decide to change these (ineffective) practices, we’re not going to use 
precious dollars that we want to see creating better results; we’re not going to send those dollars 
there. And we’re counting on the fact that, ultimately, this is an incentive, this is a challenge for 
people who do want to change.”   The authors also indicated that Republicans were leery of the 
incentive program.  They quoted Rep. John Kline (R-Minn.), the top Republican on the House 
Education and Labor Committee, who stated: “We just took a big old checkbook with a $5 
billion total behind it and handed it to the secretary (former Department of Education Secretary 
Arne Duncan) and said, ‘Write a whole bunch of checks.  I’m uncomfortable we’re doing that.”  
The authors reported that U.S. Department of Education Secretary Margaret Spellings, Duncan’s 
predecessor, worked with a fraction of that amount of funding (Washington Post, July 24, 2009).   
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Also, in the article, “Dangling $4.3 Billion, Obama Pushes States to Shift on Education,” 
Sam Dillion explained that while many educators were in favor of RTTT, others had 
reservations, especially relating to linking students’ test scores to teachers’ evaluations, a 
practice that would increase student testing rather than decrease it (New York Times, Aug. 16, 
2009).  In fact, educators represented by two primary teachers’ unions criticized segments of the 
proposal, but expressed overall satisfaction with the final legislation.  According to Nick 
Anderson, in the article, “Scoring system for school aid; Obama program assigns points to 
reform efforts in completion for funds,” representatives of both the American Federation of 
Teachers and the National Education Association, overall were satisfied with the final 
legislation, though one representative was unhappy with tying test scores to job evaluations (The 
Washington Post, November 2009).  Other criticism stemmed from academia. Dillion also 
quoted Diane Ravitch, an education historian at New York University, who stated in comments 
filed with the Department of Education: “The Department of Education should respect the 
requirements of federalism and look to states to offer their best ideas rather than mandating 
policies that the current administration likes” (New York Times, Aug. 16, 2009).   
Further research showed that the federal government encouraged states to participate in 
RTTT on a voluntary basis, but the federal government’s use of voluntarism eventually would 
give way to coercion on the path toward developing national standards. In other words, the 
research showed that RTTT was developed as a stepping stone toward getting states on board on 
a path leading to national standards. Therefore, the voluntary incentive program offered to states 
was developed to be voluntary only for a period of time, according to Barnes (2011) in her 
article, “RTTT Only Benefits Big Government.”  In that article, Barnes asserted that the 
voluntary four core standards found in RTTT actually were intended to be required past 2015 
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due to language in its blueprint.   Quoting the RTTT blueprint, Barnes wrote: “Beginning in 
2015, funds will be available only to states that are implementing assessments based on college 
and career-ready standards that are common to a significant number of states". Barnes and others 
concluded that “there is indication that if states choose not to participate in adoption of standards 
promoted by RTTT now, they will be forced to eventually adopt those standards or lose their 
Title I funding.”    
Summary 
 RTTT was developed to be a creative solution toward helping states’ departments of 
education financially to meet the requirements of NCLB.  Using the input of political actors on 
the scene, RTTT was intended to help states that were experiencing financial stress not only to 
meet the AYP requirements of NCLB, but also ease further financial stress caused by the 
recession of 2008.  However, some criticism has shown that the grants reward program included 
language that required states to meet qualifying criteria, which had not been stated in previous 
education legislation, and that language has brought scholars to conclude that the program may 
have not been within the boundaries of education policy.  Still, other scholars stated that the 
program firmly set the federal government on the pathway to support more rigorous state 
standards, which previously had been discussed, but abandoned by political actors. Despite the 
criticism, RTTT was intended to help states meet NCLB educational goals and AYP 
requirements, and not hinder education progress.  The next chapter will investigate whether the 
grants reward program was successful. 
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Chapter Five: The Success Rate of Race To The Top and A look at the Second Round of 
States’ Proposals 
 
Chapter five will discuss whether Race To The Top (RTTT) was successful, or, whether 
it actually accomplished what its authors thought it was expected to do.  According to research, 
RTTT only helped states reach Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) at only a slighter greater rate.  
Data from the Center on Education Policy (CEP) show (AYP)—the criteria for grading school 
effectiveness found in the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation—results for 2010-2011 that 
reveal states participating in RTTT fared only slightly better at meeting objectives than states 
that did not participate.   Specially, the chapter will answer the following questions:  If RTTT 
were unsuccessful, what didn’t happen?  What did happen that authors didn’t say they expected?   
The Success Rate of Race To The Top   
 
To review AYP data, the CEP, an independent non-profit data collecting organization 
that has been collecting AYP results and trends since the 2005-2006 school year, will be used. 
Analyzing the year 2011 is important because RTTT, which was adopted in 2009, had 10 Phase 
2 winners (and another two Phase 1 winners) that were disbursed initial funds in 2010 and used 
them for the 2010-2011 school year.  Therefore, it is important to see how those RTTT winners 
fared at the end of the 2010-2011 school year.  First, a review of the AYP results in 2011 is in 
order. The CEP summarized AYP results in 2011 in the following manner:  
An estimated 48% of the nation’s public schools did not make AYP in 
2011. This marks an increase from 39% in 2010 and is the highest percentage 
since NCLB took effect. 
· In 24 states and the District of Columbia, at least half of the public schools did 
not make AYP in 2011. In a majority of the states (43 and D.C.), at least one-
fourth of the schools did not make AYP. 
· The percentage of public schools not making AYP in 2011 varied greatly by 
state, from about 11% in Wisconsin to about 89% in Florida. 
 
For state-by-state AYP results, see Table 5.1 below, published by the CEP: 
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Table 5.1: Estimated percentage and number of schools in the nation and each state 
that did not make AYP in 2011 based on 2010-11 testing 
 
State  % did not make 
AYP  
% made AYP  # not making 
AYP  
Total # of 
schools  
U.S. total  48%  52%  43,942  91,618  
Alabama  27%  73%  366  1,381  
Alaska  54%  46%  273  503  
Arizona  42%  58%  814  1,938  
Arkansas  35%  65%  380  1,075  
California  66%  34%  6,465  9,871  
Colorado  58%  42%  1,001  1,714  
Connecticut  47%  53%  452  964  
Delaware  22%  78%  44  201  
D.C.  87%  13%  166  191  
Florida  91%  9%  3,449  3,776  
Georgia  27%  73%  613  2,246  
Hawaii  59%  41%  169  287  
Idaho  38%  62%  252  662  
Illinois  67%  33%  2,548  3,807  
Indiana  49%  51%  895  1,837  
Iowa  26%  74%  354  1,363  
Kansas  16%  84%  217  1,366  
Kentucky  57%  43%  651  1,148  
Louisiana  22%  78%  283  1,282  
Maine  63%  37%  380  602  
Maryland  45%  55%  614  1,375  
Massachusetts  82%  18%  1,502  1,824  
Michigan  15%  85%  523  3,409  
Minnesota  55%  45%  1,231  2,250  
Mississippi  48%  52%  425  891  
Missouri  75%  25%  1,656  2,202  
Montana  28%  72%  228  821  
Nebraska  27%  73%  260  952  
Nevada  53%  47%  335  629  
New Hampshire  71%  29%  326  458  
New Jersey  53%  47%  1,235  2,314  
New Mexico  86%  14%  718  831  
New York  47%  53%  2,165  4,589  
North Carolina  72%  28%  1,827  2,533  
North Dakota  53%  47%  245  461  
Ohio  40%  60%  1,454  3,628  
Oklahoma  30%  70%  526  1,777  
Oregon  46%  54%  586  1,270  
Pennsylvania  25%  75%  769  3,096  
Rhode Island  19%  81%  55  296 
     
South Carolina  76%  24%  851  1,126  
South Dakota  17%  83%  113  667  
Tennessee  49%  51%  793  1,635  
Texas  28%  72%  2,190  7,826  
Utah  24%  76%  236  981  
Vermont  72%  28%  217  301  
Virginia  61%  39%  1,126  1,847  
Washington  62%  38%  1,356  2,203  
West Virginia  48%  52%  361  757  
Wisconsin  11%  89%  223  2,107  
Wyoming  7%  93%  24  348  
(Usher, 2012, Center on Education Policy) 
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The two Phase 1 winners of RTTT grants were Delaware and Tennessee and the 
10 Phase 2 winners were the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and Rhode Island (“Nine States and the 
District of Columbia Win Second Round of Race to the Top Grants,” U.S. Department of 
Education, 1).  According to Table 5.1, we see that RTTT states and the District of 
Columbia only fared slightly better at meeting AYP objective than other states not 
participating in RTTT.  
 Although Arne Duncan, then secretary of the U.S. Department of Education 
(DE), had high hopes of the RTTT states succeeding with desired educational outcomes, 
the data show in Table 5.1 that nearly half of the 12 winning states and District of 
Columbia for Phase 1 and Phase 2 grants from the RTTT fund did not make AYP.  In 
fact, five of the 12 winners, or 42 percent of the winners, had more than 50 percent of 
their schools that failed to make AYP in 2011, consisting of the following: the District of 
Columbia, with 87 percent of its schools failing to make AYP; Florida, with 91 percent of 
its schools failing to make AYP; Hawaii, with 59 percent of its schools failing to make 
AYP; Massachusetts, with 82 percent of its schools failing to make AYP; and North 
Carolina, with 72 percent of its schools failing to make AYP.  Behind those states were 
the following RTTT winning states that failed to make AYP in 2011:  Maryland, with 45 
percent of its schools failing to make AYP; New York, with 47 percent of its schools 
failing to make AYP; Ohio, with 40 percent of its schools failing to make AYP; and 
Tennessee with 49 percent of its schools failing to make AYP.  Only three winning RTTT 
states had fewer than one third of its schools failing to make AYP in 2011, and consisted 
of the following:  Delaware with 22 percent of its schools failing to make AYP; Georgia, 
78 
 
with 27 percent of its schools failing to make AYP; and Rhode Island with 19 percent of 
its schools failing to make AYP.  
 Considering that 48 percent of the nation’s schools did not make AYP in 2011, 
we see that RTTT winners did not contribute much in helping that number decrease as 42 
percent of RTTT schools did not make AYP in 2011.  Clearly, the authors of RTTT did 
not expect such dire results, but rather they expected for the percentage of schools failing 
to make AYP to decrease substantially.  
However, according to the federal education department, RTTT states did see a modest 
improvement in graduation rates, number of students taking Advanced Placement(AP) tests, 
number of students scoring 3 or higher on AP tests, which qualified them for college credit for 
those scores. The DE also maintained that, for the first 12 grantees, the states’ role in teaching 
and learning in our nation’s K-!2 public schools has changed as state leaders and superintendents 
have forged partnerships with principals, teachers, local leaders, nonprofits and other 
stakeholders (“Fundamental Change Innovation in America’s Schools Under Race to the Top 
Executive Summary,” 2015, U.S. Department of Education Office of State Support).  
 The DE reported that 46 total states and the District of Columbia submitted RTTT 
applications for Phase 1 and 2 competitions, but only 12 states and the District of Columbia 
received awards in 2010 for Phase 1 and 2 competitions.  The awards ranged from $75 million to 
$700 million to make “systemwide, coordinated educational improvements for students and 
teachers in the four core areas. State work under the grants ended in summer 2015, except 
Hawaii, where grant work ended in September 2014” (“Fundamental Change Innovation in 
America’s Schools Under Race to the Top Executive Summary,” 2015, U.S. Department of 
Education Office of State Support).    
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 Duncan stated the following on Aug. 24, 2010, when he announced the Phase 2 
winners:  
Today, 10 applicants have won grants in the second phase of the Race to 
the Top competition. Along with Phase 1 winners Delaware and Tennessee, 11 
states and the District of Columbia have now been awarded money in the Obama 
Administration's groundbreaking education reform program that will directly 
impact 13.6 million students, and 980,000 teachers in 25,000 schools. 
 The 10 winning Phase 2 applications in alphabetical order are: the District 
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, and Rhode Island.   
These states show what is possible when adults come together to do the 
right thing for children. 
Every state that applied showed a tremendous amount of leadership and a 
bold commitment to education reform. The creativity and innovation in each of 
these applications is breathtaking. We set a high bar and these states met the 
challenge.  (“Nine States and the District of Columbia Win Second Round of 
Race to the Top Grants,” U.S. Department of Education, 1).  
 
Although Duncan and the authors of RTTT projected that our nation’s schools 
would create an atmosphere of education excellence with RTTT funds, data show 
otherwise.         
The Second Round of Competition for Race To The Top Funding: The District of 
Columbia Public Schools  
 
In this section, I will answer questions such as the primary question:  What is the main 
generalization that can be made about a winning application?  After viewing the requirements of 
RTTT, basically a winning application included a solid plan that met the RTTT objectives. The 
applications won the following points based on specified categories, including the following:  
state success factors, 125 points; standards and assessments, 70 points; data systems to support 
instruction, 47 points; great teachers and leaders, 138 points; turning around the lowest achieving 
schools, 50 points, and general selection criteria, 55 points. (“Race to the Top Program Executive 
Summary,” 2009, U.S. Department of Education, 3).  
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Specifically, to answer that question, I will focus on the District of Columbia Public 
Schools, whose education officials submitted a successful proposal in Phase 2, and trace how 
that proposal fared during the review process.  The District of Columbia was selected because it 
beat all 50 states with the highest percentage of its schools, or 91 percent of its schools, that 
failed to make AYP during the 2010 school year, the year it won a RTTT grant reward (Usher, 
“Update with 2009-10 Data and Five-Year Trends:  How Many Schools Have Not Made 
Adequate Yearly Progress?” Center on Education Policy, 6). Also, the District of Columbia only 
had one state beating it in having the highest number of schools not making AYP in 2011.  As 
mentioned earlier, the District of Columbia had 87 percent of its schools failing to make AYP in 
2011, with only Florida beating it with 91 percent of its schools failing to make AYP in 2011 
(Usher, 2012, “AYP Results for 2010-11 — November 2012 Update,” Center on Education 
Policy).  
 In 2010, the District of Columbia was awarded a $74,998,962 RTTT grant reward, and 
was able to use 12.5 percent of the grant during the 2010-2011 school year, which equaled 
$9,374,870 in accordance with the submitted plan.  After one year, the DE reviewed its plan and 
results before issuing the remaining balance (“Scopes of Work Decision Letters” [District of 
Columbia], 2010). 
A look at the District of Columbia Public Schools reveal that enrollment has increased 
steadily by several hundred to 1,000 students each year for the past five years, with 48,653 total 
students enrolled during the 2015-16 school year.  Also, that school year, there were 4,000 
teachers, 109 principals and more than 100 schools (The District of Columbia Public Schools, 
http://dcps.dc.gov/page/dcps-organization).  According to the District of Columbia’s application, 
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the district planned to accomplish the following as presented on the table below taken from the 
District of Columbia’s RTTT application: 
Table 5.2: Washington D.C.’s Practice/Plans by Assurance Area for RTTT Application 
Assurance Current Practice RTTT Plans 
Standards and     
Assessments 
 
•DC’s state standards are among the strongest 
in the nation, having received a grade of 
“A”from Stanford University’s Hoover Digest 
• Many DC schools (but not statewide) have 
interim assessments aligned to summative 
assessments, providing real-time information 
about student strengths and weaknesses 
• Move swiftly to adopt the new Common 
Core Standards, with 
the meeting date for the State Board’s 
approval already set 
 
• Move swiftly to adopt the new Common Core 
Standards, with the meeting date for the State 
Board’s approval already set 
• Create new summative assessments aligned 
with the Common Core Standards with non-
RTTT funds, with a consortium of states 
• Require LEAs to use interim assessments that 
will be aligned with the Common Core 
Standards 
 
Data Systems 
to Improve 
Instruction 
 
• Instructional improvement systems exist in 
DCPS and in several charter schools 
• Data-driven instructional practices are 
beginning to proliferate across the District 
• Fund the development of instructional 
improvement systems for 
LEAs that lack sufficient systems to support 
data-driven instruction 
• Fund capacity-building for school-level data 
analysis to ensure that student data are 
analyzed and used to improve instruction 
 
Great Teachers 
and Leaders 
 
• DC has extensive experience working with a 
large local network of national partners 
• Alternative certification providers for 
teachers 
and principals contribute significantly to 
DC’s human capital pipeline 
• Teacher evaluations that use student growth 
as a primary component are being informed 
by DCPS 
• Human capital decisions such as targeted 
intervention, additional compensation and 
dismissal are becoming enabled by 
evaluations 
 
 • Hold all certification providers, including 
alternative providers, to evaluations based on 
graduates’ effectiveness; program approval will 
be subject to revocation if graduate 
performance 
does not meet DC standards 
 • Build and support stronger pipelines for 
effective teachers and principals 
• Require all participating LEAs to have 
evaluations in place for principals and teachers 
based on at least 50% student growth 
• Support human capital decisions based on 
evaluations through investment in systems for 
decision-making, as well as professional 
development systems aligned to evaluations 
• Create professional development 
collaboratives to support the dissemination of 
teacher effectiveness across the system 
 
School 
Turnaround 
 
• DC has an established track record of 
closing 
low-achieving schools 
• Each of the four RTTT turnaround models 
has 
already been used in DC schools 
 
• Adopt a statewide definition of “persistently 
lowest-achieving” 
schools and ensure that turnaround plans exist 
for all schools in this category 
• Fund planning and support efforts of school 
turnaround teams 
 
(“Race to the Top Application Assurances,” 2010, by the District of Columbia Public Schools, 
U.S. Department of Education,10-11) 
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Here is a summary of the District of Columbia’s scores: 
Table 5.3: Washington, D.C.’s Scoresheet for RTTT Application 
 
State Success Factors 125 
Total Points Available 
D.C. (Tier 1) 103.6 
Total Points Earned 
 
D.C. (Tier 2) 113 
Total Points Earned 
Standards/Assessments 70 
Total Points Available 
D.C. (Tier 1) 68  
Total Points Earned 
D.C. (Tier 2) 68.4 
Total Points Earned  
 
Data Systems 47 
Total Points Available 
 
D.C. (Tier1) 34.6 
Total Points Earned 
D.C. (Tier 2) 35.4 
Total Points Earned 
Great Teachers/Leaders 138 
Total Points Available 
 
D.C.  (Tier 1) 114.6 
Total Points Earned 
D.C. (Tier 2) 117.8 
Total Points Earned 
Turn Around Lowest  
Achieving Schools 50 
Total Points Available 
 
D.C. (Tier 1) 46 
Total Points Earned  
 
D.C. (Tier 2) 47.6 
Total Points Earned 
General 55 
Total Points Available 
 
D.C. (Tier 1) 52.8  
Total Points Earned  
(Tier 2) 52.8 
Total Points Earned 
Overall Total 500 
Points Available 
 
D.C. (Tier 1) 434.6 
Total Points Earned 
D.C. (Tier 2) 450 
Total Points Earned 
(“Race to the Top Panel Review by Applicant for District of Columbia Phase 2,” 2010, U.S. 
Department of Education, 1). 
 
 The District of Columbia’s ambition plan and high scores earned for the plan fell short of 
desired outcomes in terms of achieving AYP in 2011.  As shown in Table 5.3, within each 
category, the District of Columbia earned 12 points or fewer from the total points available, and 
such high scores clearly secured RTTT funds.   
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In the District of Columbia’s application, under standards and assessments, it is 
particularly clear that the district’s goal was to meet RTTT guidelines, despite some criticism 
directed toward those guidelines.  As shown in Table 5.2, the District of Columbia’s application 
stated the district was committed to accomplish the following with RTTT funds under standards 
and assessments: “move swiftly to adopt the new Common Core Standards, with the meeting 
date for the State Board’s approval already set; create new summative assessments aligned with 
the Common Core Standards with non-RTTT funds, with a consortium of states; require LEAs 
(local education agencies) to use interim assessments that will be aligned with the Common Core 
Standards” (“Race to the Top Application Assurances,” 2010, U.S. Department of Education,10-
11).  Creating Common Core standards with other states, which was a move toward a 
requirement of national standards, along with having interim assessments that were aligned with 
Common Core standards, was an area that differed from No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in that 
there was a requirement for standards in which assessments must have been aligned in RTTT and 
not in NCLB.  As mentioned earlier, some criticism of RTTT surfaced because national 
standards were not previously required by established education policy.  Also, the RTTT 
expectations under the category “Great Teachers and Leaders” was that teachers’ and 
administrators’ evaluations be tied to students’ assessment scores, another area of concern of 
RTTT mentioned earlier.  As expected, as shown in Table 5.2, the District of Columbia’s 
application stated that the district would “require all participating LEAs to have evaluations in 
place for principals and teachers based on at least 50% student growth” (“Race to the Top 
Application Assurances,” 2010, U.S. Department of Education,10-11). Clearly, despite criticism 
of RTTT in terms of common standards being required and evaluations being based on student 
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growth, officials at the District of Columbia Public Schools geared their plan to be a winner, 
which was to secure funds using guidelines set by RTTT. 
  Not only did the District of Columbia fail to meet desired educational outcomes in 2011, 
but it has drastically failed in meeting AYP for each year during a five-year span of time prior to 
2011. To understand the District of Columbia’s shortcomings, it is important to first review their 
projections. The following charts were included in the “District of Columbia Consolidated State 
Application Accountability Workbook” plan submitted to the federal education department on 
Feb. 9, 2010.  The plan, which had been revised nearly every year from 2003 until 2010 “details 
the policies and procedures relating to the educational assessment and accountability policies of 
the District of Columbia,” as required by NCLB (“District of Columbia Consolidated State 
Application Accountability Workbook,” by the District of Columbia Office of the State 
Superintendent of Education, 2010, U.S. Department of Education, 2). 
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Table 5.4:  NCLB Targets 2002-2014 
Elementary Reading (Grades 3-6) – Annual Targets and (Six) Intermediate Goals 
for SY2002-2014 (Percentage Scoring at the Proficient or Above Level)  
 
 
                      100  
                  86.85 86.85   
              73.69 73.69       
          60.53 60.53          
    47.37 47.37        
  34.21 34.21          
21.05 21.05            
             
    1   2   3   4   5   6 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
(“District of Columbia Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook,” by the 
District of Columbia Office of the State Superintendent of Education, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Education, 41.) 
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Table 5.5:  NCLB Targets 2002-2014 
Elementary Mathematics (Grades 3-6) – Annual Targets and (Six) Intermediate Goals for 
SY2002-2014 (Percentage Scoring at the Proficient or Above Level) 
                     100 
                85.07 85.07   
            70.14 70.14       
        55.21 55.21       
    40.27 40.27        
  25.35 25.35          
10.42 10.42            
                          
    1   2   3   4   5   6 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
(“District of Columbia Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook,” by the 
District of Columbia Office of the State Superintendent of Education, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Education, 41.) 
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Table 5.6:  NCLB Targets 2002-2014 
Secondary Reading (Grades 7-11) – Annual Targets and (Six) Intermediate Goals for 
SY2002-2014 (Percentage Scoring at the Proficient or Above Level) 
                    100  
                85.90 85.90   
            71.79 71.79       
        57.69 57.69           
    43.58 43.58        
  29.48 29.48          
15.38 15.38            
                          
    1   2   3   4   5   6 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
(“District of Columbia Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook,” by the 
District of Columbia Office of the State Superintendent of Education, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Education, 41.) 
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Table 5.7:  NCLB Targets 2002-2014 
Secondary Mathematics (Grades 7-11) – Annual Targets and (Six) Intermediate Goals for 
SY2002-2014 (Percentage Scoring at the Proficient or Above Level) 
                    100  
                
85.1
4 
85.1
4   
            
70.2
7 
70.2
7       
        
55.4
1 
55.4
1           
    
40.5
4 
40.5
4        
  
25.6
8 
25.6
8          
10.8
1 
10.8
1            
                          
    1   2   3   4   5   6 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
(“District of Columbia Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook,” by the 
District of Columbia Office of the State Superintendent of Education, 2010, U.S. Department of 
Education, 41.) 
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 The above projections were made by the District of Columbia Public Schools to comply 
with the expectations of meeting AYP found in NCLB.  But, in reality, none of the projections 
were met. According to the CEP, the District of Columbia Public Schools’ AYP results from 
2006 until 2010 show the following failure:  in the 2005-2006 school year, 85 percent of D.C. 
schools failed to meet AYP; in the 2006-2007 school year, 75 percent of D.C. schools failed to 
meet AYP; in the 2007-2008 school year, 77 percent of D.C. schools failed to meet AYP; in the 
2008-2009 school year, 75 percent of D.C. schools failed to meet AYP; and in the 2009-2010 
school year, 91 percent of D.C. schools failed to meet AYP (Usher, 2010, “Update with 2009-10 
Data and Five-Year Trends: How Many Schools Have Not Made Adequate Yearly Progress?, 
Center on Education Policy, 6).  Also, as we have seen, even with a RTTT grant for the 2010-
2011 school year, as shown, 87 percent of D.C. school failed to meet AYP in the 2010-2011 
school year (Usher, 2012, “AYP Results for 2010-11 — November 2012 Update,” Center on 
Education Policy, 4). 
As shown, the District of Columbia has consistently failed to meet AYP goals from 2006 
until 2011, despite winning a RTTT grant to improve its failing schools.  
An Overview and Survey of A Successful School District:  The School District of Ladue in 
St. Louis County, Missouri 
 
 Although the District of Columbia Public Schools have struggled in meeting AYP goals 
since the inception of NCLB, the School District of Ladue in St. Louis County, Missouri, has 
performed better at meeting those goals.  However, it is important to note that Ladue Schools do 
not share average characteristics.  Ladue is one of the wealthiest school districts in the State of 
Missouri, (Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Finance Data and 
Statistics Summary, 2016). More importantly, Ladue Schools have consistently exceeded annual 
proficiency targets for the State of Missouri from 2002 until 2011, with 77.8 percent of students 
90 
 
scoring proficient in 2011, exceeding the state goal of 75.5 proficiency target (Missouri 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Comprehensive Data System, 2016). In 
fact, Ladue Horton Watkins High School (LHWHS) was rated as the top school in the State of 
Missouri by U.S. News and World Report in 2016. The school district is socioeconomically 
diverse with an operating budget of $58.8 million and anticipated revenue of $59.6 million in 
2016. Of the total district revenue, 94 percent is derived from local sources, the majority of 
which comes from property taxes. Ladue is very small in comparison to the District of Columbia 
Public Schools. Ladue Schools experienced an enrollment increase starting in 2003, with 
enrollment increasing 23 percent over the next ten years and exceeding 4,000 students (for the 
first time since 1978) during the 2013-14 school year. Ladue Schools’ total enrollment was 4,165 
students in 2015, (compared to 48,653 students’ total enrollment in the District of Columbia 
Public Schools during the 2015-16 school year).  Ladue Schools reported 297 full-time teachers, 
23 administrators, and seven schools serving K-12 students during the 2015-16 school year. (In 
comparison in the District of Columbia, there were 4,000 teachers, 109 principals and more than 
100 schools) (Ladue Schools District Profile, 2016).  Ladue has 37 percent minority enrollment, 
which is 10 percent higher than the average minority enrollment in the State of Missouri (Public 
School Review, 2016).    
 Because the Ladue School District has performed in such an exemplary fashion, the 
district was chosen as a source for a survey of teachers and administrators centering on RTTT.  
The survey has revealed important opinions concerning the grants reward program.  Teachers 
and administrators at LHWHS, Ladue Middle School (LMS), and Spoede Elementary School 
(SES) were asked three closed-ended questions in which they checked boxes to report their 
opinions and one open-ended question in which they wrote responses. The three checked 
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questions are following:  1) Student performance on state tests should be the main data source to 
determine whether students are at least proficient in a content area; 2) Student performance on 
state tests should be used as one measure of effectiveness on teachers’/administrators’ 
evaluations; and 3) National standards are a good idea.  Teachers and administrators had the 
following choices: 1) strongly agree; 2) moderately agree; 3) agree; 4) neutral; 5) disagree; 6) 
moderately disagree; and 7) strongly disagree.  At LHWHS, 22 teachers and two administrators 
responded to the survey.  At LMS, 19 teachers and one administrator responded to the survey. At 
SES, three teachers and one administrator responded to the survey. The following charts show 
results: 
Table 5.8  
Ladue Horton Watkins High School Teachers’ and Administrators’ Survey Results 
Question Strongly 
Agree 
 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Moderately 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
State tests 
should 
determine 
student 
proficiency. 
0 1 2 3 5 4 9 
Student 
performance 
should 
determine 
teacher and 
administrator 
effectiveness.  
0 1 4 2 5 2 10 
National 
Standards are 
a good idea. 
1 4 9 4 2 0 4 
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Table 5.9 
 Ladue Middle School Teachers’ and Administrators’ Survey Results 
Question Strongly 
Agree 
 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Moderately 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
State tests 
should 
determine 
student 
proficiency.  
0 1 3 2 4 3 7 
Student 
performance 
should 
determine 
effectiveness 
of teachers/ 
administrators.  
1 1 5 0 4 1 8 
National 
Standards are 
a good idea. 
5 9 4 0 1 0 1 
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Table 5.10 
 Spoede Elementary School Teachers’ Survey Results 
Question Strongly 
Agree 
 
Moderately 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Moderately 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
State tests 
should 
determine 
student 
proficiency. 
0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Student 
performance 
should 
determine 
effectiveness 
of teachers/ 
administrators.  
0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
National 
Standards are 
a good idea. 
2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 (Tables 5.8-5.10, Results from Angela Early’s original survey conducted with teachers and 
administrators at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue Middle School, and Spoede 
Elementary School, St. Louis County, Missouri, 2016). 
 
An analysis of Table 5.8 showed that teachers surveyed at LHWHS disagreed at a rate of 
77 percent (in the combined categories of disagree, moderately disagree, and strongly disagree) 
that students’ performance on state tests should be the main data source to determine whether 
students are at least proficient in a content area. The results also showed that LHWHS teachers 
surveyed disagreed at a rate of 68 percent (in the combined categories of disagree, moderately 
disagree, and strongly disagree) that students’ performance on state tests should be used as one 
measure of effectiveness on teachers’ evaluations. Finally, the results showed that teachers 
surveyed at LHWHS only slightly agreed at a rate of 59 percent (in the combined categories of 
strongly agree, moderately agree and agree) that national standards are a good idea (Results from 
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Angela Early’s original survey conducted with teachers at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, 
Ladue Middle School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
Results from Table 5.8 also included two administrators who completed surveys.  The 
administrators surveyed at LHWHS were split at a rate of 50 percent (in the combined categories 
of strongly agree, moderately agree, and agree and the combined categories of disagree, 
moderately disagree, and strongly disagree) that students’ performance on state tests should be 
the main data source to determine whether students are at least proficient in a content area, with 
one moderately in agreement and one strongly in disagreement. Results from administrators 
surveyed at LHWHS also showed that they disagreed at a rate of 100 percent (in the combined 
categories of strongly, disagree, moderately disagree and disagree) that students’ performance on 
state tests should be used as one measure of effectiveness on administrators’ evaluations. Finally, 
results showed that administrators were split by a rate of 50 percent (in the combined categories 
of strongly agree, moderately agree, and agree and the combined categories of disagree, 
moderately disagree, and strongly disagree) on whether national standards are a good idea, with 
one administer moderately agreeing and one administrator disagreeing (Results from Angela 
Early’s original survey conducted with  administrators at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, 
Ladue Middle School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
An analysis of Table 5.9 showed similar results among LMS teachers, as chart eight 
among LHWHS teachers and administrators. Teachers surveyed at LMS disagreed at a rate of 73 
percent (in the combined categories of disagree, moderately disagree, and strongly disagree) that 
students’ performance on state tests should be the main data source to determine whether 
students are at least proficient in a content area. Results for LMS teachers surveyed also showed 
they disagreed at a rate of 68 percent (in the combined categories of disagree, moderately 
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disagree, and strongly disagree) that students’ performance on state tests should be used as one 
measure of effectiveness on teachers’ evaluations. Finally, results showed that teachers surveyed 
at LMS agreed at a rate of 89 percent (in the combined categories of strongly agree, moderately 
agree and agree) that national standards are a good idea (Results from Angela Early’s original 
survey conducted with teachers at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue Middle School, 
and Spoede Elementary School). 
 Results from Table 5.9 also included one administrator surveyed at LMS.  The results 
from the LMS administrator differed from teachers and administrators at LHWHS. The survey of 
the LMS administrator showed the administrator agreed that students’ performance on state tests 
should be the main data source to determine whether students are at least proficient in a content 
area. Results from the LMS administrator also showed that the administrator agreed that 
students’ performance on state tests should be used as one measure of effectiveness on 
administrators’ evaluations. Finally, results showed the LMS administrator strongly agreed that 
national standards are a good idea (Results from Angela Early’s original survey conducted with 
administrators at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue Middle School, and Spoede 
Elementary School). 
Additionally, an analysis of Table 5.10 showed that teachers and one administrator 
surveyed at SES agreed with their peers at LHWHS and teachers at LMS. Results showed that 
SES teachers surveyed disagreed at a rate of 100 percent (in the combined categories of disagree, 
moderately disagree, and strongly disagree) that students’ performance on state tests should be 
the main data source to determine whether students are at least proficient in a content area. 
Furthermore, results for SES teachers surveyed showed teachers disagreed at a rate of 100 
percent (in the combined categories of disagree, moderately disagree, and strongly disagree) that 
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students’ performance on state tests should be used as one measure of effectiveness on teachers’ 
evaluations. Finally, results showed that teachers surveyed at SES agreed at a rate of 100 percent 
(in the combined categories of strongly agree, moderately agree and agree) that national 
standards are a good idea (Results from Angela Early’s original survey conducted with teachers 
at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue Middle School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
Finally, results from Table 5.10 showed that the one SES administrator were in line with 
teachers and administrators at LHWHS and teachers at LMS. The SES administrator disagreed 
that students’ performance on state tests should be the main data source to determine whether 
students are at least proficient in a content area. Results from the SES administrator also showed 
that the administrator disagreed that students’ performance on state tests should be used as one 
measure of effectiveness on administrators’ evaluations. Furthermore, survey results showed the 
SES administrator strongly agreed that national standards are a good idea (Results from Angela 
Early’s original survey conducted with administrators at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, 
Ladue Middle School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
In summary, all teachers’ survey at Ladue School District showed that they disagreed that 
students’ performance on state tests should be the main data source to determine whether 
students are at least proficient in a content area.  They also disagreed that students’ performance 
on state tests should be used as one measure of effectiveness on teachers’ evaluations.  However, 
they agreed that national standards are a good idea (Results from Angela Early’s original survey 
conducted with teachers at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue Middle School, and 
Spoede Elementary School).  Because only four administrators completed surveys at Ladue 
School District, results are limited and inconclusive as to whether students’ performance on state 
tests should be the main data source to determine whether students are at least proficient in a 
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content area, whether students’ performance on state tests should be used as one measure of 
effectiveness on administrators’ evaluations, and whether national standards are a good idea 
(Results from Angela Early’s original survey conducted with administrators at Ladue Horton 
Watkins High School, Ladue Middle School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
Overall, it is important to note that survey results from one of the premiere school 
districts in the state of Missouri showed that teachers’ disagreed on two important aspects of the 
RTTT application and one important aspect of NCLB. Ladue teachers disagreed on the notion 
that students’ performance on standardized state assessments should be the main data source to 
determine whether students are at least proficient in a content area and the teachers disagreed 
that students’ performance on standardized state assessments should be used as one measure of 
effectiveness on teachers’ evaluations. Both requirements were a part of the RTTT grant 
application and annual state tests are a part of NCLB.  However, the results also showed that 
teachers agreed that national standards were a good idea, also embedded in RTTT applications. 
The point here is that if teachers at a successful district are opposed to annual standardized 
testing, then it may be fair to suppose that teacher opposition is a key element in the politics of 
annual standardized testing that NCLB and RTTT promote. 
Further analysis of survey results reveals that answers to an open-ended question on the 
teachers’ survey offered some important insights regarding effective teaching as measured by 
national standards and standardized state assessments. Most LHWHS teachers who answered the 
question stated that national standards and yearly state assessments are not required to determine 
effective teaching. The question is as follows:  Do you think effective teaching requires the use 
of national standards and yearly state assessments?  If no, how do you think effective teaching 
should be measured on the state level (in order to satisfy federal requirements)?  One LHWHS 
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teacher wrote: “The issue is that these ‘standards’ are nebulous and do not take the 
developmental arc of students into consideration enough.  The heterogeneous groupings in our 
public schools are incredible—not every child has the capability or capacity to perform at a 
standard level in a given time frame, and the one-size-fits-all tests do not adequately take this 
into consideration. As a nation, we have a woefully inadequate social support system that ensures 
inequality will persist.  From access to prenatal health, quality preschools and early intervention 
programs, to accessible mental health providers and family leave policies—we leave entire 
populations to figure it out through local programs (most under-funded), but demand these 
benchmarks of academic success by teachers who are also in many places—overworked, 
underpaid, and not supported.  Teachers definitely have an obligation to make sure students learn 
as best they can, but to tie the profession and the students up to expectations that do not reflect 
reality is simply damaging to all concerned” (Results from Angela Early’s original survey 
conducted with teachers at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue Middle School, and 
Spoede Elementary School). 
A LMS teacher, although stating national standards were a good idea, disagreed with the 
idea that effective teaching required using those standards and annual standardized state 
assessments. The teacher stated, “I feel that the premise of national standards to level the playing 
field and create common expectations is not a bad idea.  However, effective teaching really 
doesn’t have anything to do with national standards and yearly testing” (Results from Angela 
Early’s original survey conducted with teachers at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue 
Middle School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
Two LMS teachers strongly were against the use of national standards and yearly 
assessments to determine effective teaching.  One LMS teacher wrote, “I don’t think state 
99 
 
assessments should be used to ‘grade’ teachers—some kids don’t do well on tests. Looking at 
student growth from beginning to end of the year would be a good measure. Performance tasks 
would be more meaningful.” The second LMS teacher wrote, “No (effective teaching does not 
require the use of national standards and yearly state assessments). So far, the state assessments 
have been used to label districts as failing, and, thus losing their accreditation.  I don’t have 
another clear idea, but it needs to be a more wholistic approach” (Results from Angela Early’s 
original survey conducted with teachers at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, Ladue Middle 
School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
At the elementary level, the results of the open-ended question showed that SES teachers 
mostly were against the notion that effective teaching required the use of national standards and 
annual standardized state assessments. One SES teacher wrote, “Since each student is learning at 
their instructional level, effective teaching should be assessed by assessments that show student 
progress or growth.  So, assessments should be given throughout the year, not just once a year.  
All students should show some growth based on their level of learning.  Not all students should 
be required to be proficient.  That’s like saying every person should be able to hit a homerun out 
of Busch Stadium.  Every child is unique and assessments should embrace that” (Results from 
Angela Early’s original survey conducted with teachers at Ladue Horton Watkins High School, 
Ladue Middle School, and Spoede Elementary School). 
In summary, the open-ended question showed that, although Ladue teachers surveyed 
may think national standards are a good idea, when asked whether those standards coupled with 
annual standardized state assessments are required to determine effective teaching, the teachers 
were, overall, unfavorable of that notion. The views of education professionals, such as teachers 
and administrators, should be considered as vital components when developing K-12 federal 
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public education policy, especially important policy such as NCLB, RTTT, and Every Student 
Succeeds Act (ESSA).  The next section will provide an overview of ESSA. 
Every Student Succeeds Act 
This section will answer the following question:  How did the political development 
surrounding the adoption of RTTT led to the passage of ESSA?   To review, the political climate 
of NCLB was so harsh and the economic climate so severe, that President Barack Obama, who 
acted on a campaign promise, signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), 
which included $53.6 billion earmarked for the education department for assistance and 
improvement to all levels of our nation’s schools.  RTTT, a $4.35 billion grants reward program, 
was a part of that stimulus package.  The overall goal of RTTT was to improve our nation’s K-12 
public schools by financially helping them to meet AYP as called for in NCLB and to give states 
an option to develop new, locally tailored plans to meet those requirements without financial 
penalty, but rather with a grant reward.  However, a result of having a winning application was to 
meet guidelines set by RTTT.  Those guidelines included developing standards with a 
consortium of other states and tying teachers’ and administrators’ evaluations to students’ test 
scores. 
 In many ways, RTTT was a stepping stone to the adoption of ESSA. While tying 
teachers’ and administrators’ evaluations to students’ test scores are not provisions found in 
ESSA, statewide college- and career-ready standards, a statewide accountability system that 
required meeting AYP requirements, and a grants program designed to help with achieving 
statewide accountability goals are provisions found in ESSA (Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 As Amended Through P.L. 114–95, 2015). 
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Published in 2010, two education department documents showed modifications to the 
education policy climate in which NCLB had generated. The climate represented a shift from 
limited direction and no funding for states to achieve educational excellence in our nation’s K-12 
public schools as in the case of NCLB to an atmosphere that emphasized adopting national 
standards and federal funding as a way to achieve education excellence in our nations K-12 
public schools.  To be sure that the direction of education policy shifted after the adoption of 
RTTT, the DE outlined its short-ranged goals and a way to achieve them in 2010. According to 
the federal education department, the U.S., although ranked first in college graduation rate one 
generation ago, has lagged behind 10 other countries in graduation rate, as highlighted in “A 
Blueprint For Reform:  The Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act” 
(1).  Hence, a foremost goal was that the U.S. lead other nations in college completion by the 
year 2020, according to the “Blueprint for Reform” (1). To accomplish that goal, a second 
document, entitled “ESEA Reauthorization:  NCLB and the Blueprint” further explained the 
“Blueprint for Reform” by comparing the “Blueprint for Reform” to NCLB.  Here are some of 
those comparisons:   “(1)  NCLB includes a ‘Race to the Bottom’ for state standards, whereas in 
the Blueprint, states adopt college- and career-ready standards; (2) NCLB is not focused enough 
on building the profession and teacher voice, whereas the Blueprint utilizes surveys of teachers 
centering on working conditions and professional development and support; (3) NCLB had a 
narrow vision of the school’s role, whereas the Blueprint provides funding for providing 
comprehensive services so that students are safe, healthy, able to focus on learning” (1-6).  
Clearly, the federal government showed the shortcomings of NCLB by proposing modifications 
to help improve America’s schools and reporting those changes as shown in the two above 
documents.    
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The result of the push of the federal government’s involvement in education from 
NCLB in 2010 led to support for the passage of ESSA in 2015. In 2010 when the federal 
government voiced its concerns about NCLB, interest groups began to work on policy 
solutions. Common Core was the solution of The National Governors Association (NGA) 
and the Council of Chief State School Officers (COCSS).  Common Core is “a set of K-
12 math and English standards that students must master at each grade level. The 
standards are designed to prepare high school graduates to enter the workforce or take 
introductory college courses. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have 
approved Common Core” (Benton 2015). To note, the NGA and COCSS idea of 
Common Core actually fell in line with a RTTT provision in and federal government 
movement toward national standards. Although Common Core was not adopted in ESSA, 
as stated above, ESSA does require states to develop their own standards based on 
helping students meet state higher-education entrance requirements (Benton 2015). 
The bill that became ESSA was introduced on April 30, 2015 in the 114th 
Congress, 2015–2017, and sponsored by Sen. Lamar Alexander-R-Tenn. The bill, which 
received bipartisan support, was passed on Dec. 2, 2015, by the U.S. House of 
Representatives by a vote of 359 to 64, and passed on Dec. 9, 2015, by the U.S. Senate by 
a vote of 85 to 12. The law, PubL 114-95, was enacted after being signed by President 
Obama on December 10, 2015 (S.1177 Every Student Succeeds Act 2015, Government 
Track).   
 The political development of ESSA can be framed in the Multiple Streams Model 
of Policy Development.  Indeed, in our analysis of ESSA, we see that John Kingdon’s 
(2011) discussion is relevant.  First, we see that education within the governmental 
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agenda centered on a major area on the decision agenda—developing new legislation that 
would be more supportive to states departments of education than NCLB.  Using 
Kingdon’s model further, we see that the governmental agenda of education changed 
overtime from the decision agenda item by substantially modifying NCLB by offering 
financial assistance to states for their struggling schools in order to help meet AYP 
requirements and to require states develop standards common to other states as found in 
RTTT. Also, using his policy analysis model, we see that as the agenda coupling the 
problems and solutions as streams, education actors emerging during that time to ensure 
that their concerns were represented in new federal education legislation. Finally, we see 
a policy window of opportunity opening in 2014, when NCLB was up for renewal.  
Ultimately, the passage of ESSA resulted in 2015.  
Summary 
This chapter has shown that a winning RTTT application had to meet the grants reward 
program’s guidelines in a profound way.  In reviewing the District of Columbia Public Schools’ 
application, we saw that the success of that application was based on meeting RTTT criteria, 
despite criticism of that criteria.  The chapter also showed that despite winning nearly $75 
million, with nearly $10 million being administered during the 2010-2011 school year, the 
District of Columbia Public Schools’ AYP results did not help national averages as the district 
had 87 percent of its K-12 public schools failing to meet AYP in 2011. The chapter also provided 
results of a survey of education professionals administered at the Ladue School District, a top 
school district in the State of Missouri. The results showed that teachers surveyed at the district 
disagreed with the notion that students’ performance on state tests should be the main data 
source to determine whether students are at least proficient in a content area. The survey also 
104 
 
showed that teachers disagreed that students’ performance on state tests should be used as one 
measure of effectiveness on teachers’ evaluations.  Furthermore, the results showed that teachers 
surveyed, overall, thought that national standards were a good idea. But, the survey’s open-ended 
question showed that, although teachers surveyed thought national standards were a good idea, 
when asked whether those standards coupled with the requirement of yearly state tests to 
determine effective teaching was a good idea, the teachers were unfavorable of that notion. 
However, it is important to note that a successful RTTT application required states to show proof 
of provisions of those areas, even though they were seen as unpopular among teachers.  Finally, 
the chapter showed that RTTT set a firm foundation toward the adoption of ESSA by requiring 
college- and career-readiness standards and grants to help meet AYP accountability goals. It can 
be concluded that, although RTTT differed from NCLB in that it was not an unfunded mandate, 
but rather a grants reward program, it was, indeed, a stepping stone toward the adoption of 
ESSA, which included provisions for funding for the nation’s schools to meet AYP 
accountability goals and required states to develop college- and career-readiness standards. 
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Chapter Six:  Conclusion  
The federal government turned toward greater involvement in K-12 public education 
after the 1983 publication of a Nation At Risk, which portrayed America’s schools and students 
as struggling and issued recommendations to help remedy the situation.  After a long pathway of 
state accountability measures with school choice at the core in the 1990s, in 2002, President 
George W. Bush signed into law No Child Left Behind (NCLB), which required states to 
measure and document the Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) of their students through yearly tests. 
The legislation stated that federal funds could be withheld if states did not meet achievement 
goals. The legislation was hurled by educational professionals as unrealistic, as all students, 
regardless of socioeconomic levels and background, were required to score proficient or advance 
on tests, or states could face serious consequences. As a result, many scholars called the 
legislation an unfunded mandate.    
After much criticism and many states’ continual failure to meet AYP objectives, the 
legislation was substantially modified in 2009 with Race To The Top (RTTT), a grants reward 
program that provided states with winning applications monetary support in their attempt to 
satisfy federal education requirements. Passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law in 2009 
by President Barack Obama, the grants reward program also only achieved modest success with 
AYP gains in the short-term. Also, teachers have criticized portions of the requirements of the 
program, including the requirement of standardized testing to show student achievement and the 
requirement of tying teachers’ evaluations to test scores. However, standardized testing to show 
student achievement and documentation of student achievement continued to be a part of the 
latest federal education policy, ESSA, signed into law by President Obama in 2015. 
The research has shown that the political development of RTTT is a classic  
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case of the punctuated equilibrium framework of policy change as developed by scholars Frank 
R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones (2009).  To review, the scholars argued that new policy is 
managed by forming new institutions run by power elites, a practice that makes an area of policy 
appear to be stable as only incremental changes occur.  Indeed, from 2002 when NCLB was 
passed until about 2006 when the deadline for the law’s renewal drew near, there were new 
forms of institutions—particularly developed in states’ departments of education—in charge of 
structuring and managing implementation as well as handling some federal incremental changes, 
creating an illusion of equilibrium run by power elites.  
However, second, Baumgartner and Jones argued that long-time institutions and political 
processes can be rapidly interrupted—action that can be understood with the agenda setting 
model (4).  The agenda setting model actually interrupts what may appear to have been a policy 
monopoly, “created by iron triangles, policy subsystems and policy networks” (5).   Media 
attention particularly is a necessary part of agenda setting.  As the media is focused on a 
problem, incrementalism is undermined as allocation of attention to a problem is heightened, 
leading to periodic punctuations that disrupt temporary equilibrium (10).   Indeed, as shown by 
the political development of RTTT, although many of the NCLB established institutions have 
remained in place until present, starting about 2006, public interest groups, scholars and other 
stakeholders began pressuring congressional leaders to amend or substantially modify the law, 
and, thereby, secured media attention.  When public officials were under media pressure to turn 
their attention to amending or substantially modifying NCLB, interest groups had created an 
atmosphere ready for political change. 
Third, Baumgartner and Jones argue that policy entrepreneurs look for an opportunity to 
push their initiative to the forefront of the agenda, or make sure it does not arrive (20).  
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Sometimes, the issue has received so much media attention that it becomes too large to be 
confined to subsystems, and, as a result, political parties may embrace the issue in order to 
receive an electoral advantage (22). In the case of RTTT, the issue of modifying NCLB had 
become so large that it became an issue of political parties during the 2008 presidential election.  
Indeed, the campaign and election of President Obama in 2008 created an opportunity for 
education policy entrepreneurs to push their initiative, a substantial modification of NCLB, to the 
forefront of the agenda using the political parties. The passage of RTTT showed the 2009 
swearing in office of President Obama further solidified the political environment for a policy 
punctuation as shown by President Obama’s early action—the July 2009 unveiling of RTTT, 
which, actually was included in that year’s stimulus package, passed in February 2009. Indeed, 
the research clearly has shown that the political development of RTTT can be seen as a classic 
case embedded in the punctuated equilibrium model of policy development.  
The development of the policy also can be framed in the Multiple Streams Model 
of Policy Development.  Indeed, in our analysis of NCLB, we saw that John Kingdon’s 
(2011) discussion is relevant.  First, we saw that education within the governmental 
agenda centered on a major area on the decision agenda—developing relief from NCLB 
from 2005.  Using Kingdon’s model further, we saw that the governmental agenda of 
education changed overtime from the decision agenda item substantially modifying the 
legislation to give quick relief from the grip of the legislation. Also, using his discussion, 
we saw that as the agenda coupling the problems and solutions as streams, education 
actors emerging during that time to ensure that their groups were represented in the 
legislation. Finally, we saw a policy window of opportunity opening in 2008, with the 
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election of President Obama, and, ultimately, the passage of RTTT within the bounds of 
ARRA in 2009.  
Clearly, the passage of RTTT showed that politicians and policy actors were so absorbed 
in satisfying various education stakeholders and seizing the moment of a policy punctuation or 
window of opportunity to achieve a massive goal—improving the nation’s schools—that they 
developed policy that yielded modest or insignificant results. Although RTTT offered funding to 
help our nation’s schools and improved NCLB, legislation that many scholars called an unfunded 
mandate, it still was caught in the confinement of the NCLB legislation, which required schools 
to meet unrealistic AYP goals. While satisfying education stakeholders’ and other policy actors’ 
plea for assistance with meeting NCLB objectives (by providing funds for states to develop 
creative education plans and offer relief from the one-size-fits all plans under NCLB), RTTT still 
used the same measurement of success, AYP goals in which struggling districts are hard-pressed 
to meet.  Thus, although RTTT provided necessary funding to winning states with struggling 
districts, states appeared still to fail even after employing RTTT funds under the existing AYP 
standards.  In fact, the research showed that the District of Columbia, although winning a RTTT 
grant in 2010, fell short of meeting AYP goals in 2011. Additionally, survey results showed that 
teachers in a top school district in the State of Missouri did not strongly support key provisions 
of a RTTT application, including requiring usage of standardized testing to show student 
achievement and tying teachers’ evaluations to test scores.   
With the passage of RTTT, politicians prepared the pathway for the passage of Every 
Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) by providing a mechanism for funding, requiring college- and 
career-readiness standards, and creating an avenue to develop locally-tailored programs in order 
to meet AYP goals, although it is too early to determine the rate of success of ESSA.   
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Implications 
 The main implication of this dissertation is that federal involvement in K-12 public 
education policy has been on an upward swing since the mid- to late-1980s, but many political 
actors in the education field think federal involvement is low in effectiveness. Many education 
actors consistently have voiced opposition to major federal policies that have changed the nature 
of teaching and learning in the nation’s schools, particularly policies that have required students 
to take annual yearly assessments in order to document student achievement, necessitating that 
all children reach proficiency or advanced on assessments, or failing districts may risk losing 
federal funding, and potentially face other severe ramifications such as teachers’ and 
administrators’ contracts not being renewed and school closings.  Additionally, national research 
has shown that NCLB has been ineffective from the time of its implementation in 2002 as 
struggling districts continued to struggle, even with the passage of state education grants in 2009 
the form of RTTT that showed modest or insignificant short-term gains for winning states as 
AYP goals continued to be hard-pressed to meet.  
Future Research  
Future research needs to be conducted on the effectiveness of ESSA, particularly 
showing results of annual state testing, especially within districts that qualify for federal grants to 
determine the long-term effectiveness of the grants. Also, future research should involve strongly 
education professionals’ views, particularly those of K-12 public education teachers, in order to 
effectively develop any future federal education policy. Additionally, future comprehensive 
research should be conducted on areas with large struggling student populations, such as the 
District of Columbia, in order to effectively identify and resolve complex, counterproductive 
situations so that teaching and learning can occur within those populations.  Furthermore, future 
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research should include monitoring the federal education climate as another punctuation in the 
education environment may be in the midst as highlighted by the recent election of President 
Donald J. Trump, whose education secretary, Betsy DeVos (narrowly confirmed by the U.S. 
Senate by an unprecedented tie-breaking vote by Vice President Michael Pence after protest 
largely due to her lack of public education experience) is an advocate of charter schools (The 
New York Times, Feb. 7, 2017).  DeVos may push for school closings for failing schools as she is 
a strong supporter of school choice. Such action potentially could minimize or negate any future 
positive long-term effects of RTTT if struggling schools are shut down rather than aided with 
federal grants. Finally, future research should investigate other measures of student success, such 
as the development of student portfolios throughout a school year, rather than relying solely on 
student testing as measured by AYP goals to determine student success.  
Through continued research, monitoring, and advocacy, the end result will be the 
production of effective federal education policy that helps create an education climate that 
consists of meeting students’ environmental, emotional, and intellectual needs, buffered with the 
appropriate resources, in order to obtain excellence in education for children in our nation’s K-12 
public schools.  
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